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ANIMAL LAW—CULTIVATING  COMPASSIONATE  LAW: UNLOCK­
ING THE LABORATORY DOOR AND SHINING LIGHT ON THE INADE­
QUACIES & CONTRADICTIONS OF THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT 
“Universally, humans exploit and kill other animals because 
legally they can.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) re­
ported that there were 124,385 nonhuman primates confined in lab­
oratories in 2009.2  Of those confined, 70,444 primates were used in 
laboratory research.3  Of those used in research, 1,711 primates 
were used in painful procedures, but their pain was not alleviated 
because pain-relieving drugs would have interfered with or compro­
mised the research.4 
1. Joan Dunayer, From Vivisection to Animal Rights, 13 ORG. & ENV’T 429, 430 
(2000). 
2. ANIMAL & PLANT  HEALTH  INSPECTION  SERV., U. S. DEP’T OF  AGRIC., AN­
NUAL REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR, PAIN TYPE: TOTAL 2 (2011) [herein­
after PAIN  TYPE: TOTAL 2009], available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/ 
efoia/downloads/2009_Animals_Used_In_Research.pdf; ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH IN­
SPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ANNUAL REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL 
YEAR, PAIN TYPE: ANIMAL NOT YET USED 2 (2011) [hereinafter PAIN TYPE: ANIMALS 
NOT  YET  USED 2009], available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/efoia/ 
downloads/2009_Animals_Used_In_Research.pdf.  The USDA reported that in 2009 a 
total of 1,131,206 nonhuman animals were confined in laboratories; 979,772 were used 
in laboratory research. PAIN TYPE: TOTAL, supra, at 2; PAIN TYPE: ANIMALS NOT YET 
USED 2009, supra, at 2. 
3. PAIN TYPE: TOTAL 2009, supra note 2, at 1-2. R 
4. ANIMAL & PLANT  HEALTH  INSPECTION  SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF  AGRIC., AN­
NUAL REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR, PAIN TYPE: WITH PAIN, NO DRUGS 2 
(2011) [hereinafter PAIN TYPE: WITH PAIN, NO DRUGS 2009], available at http://www. 
aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/efoia/downloads/2009_Animals_Used_In_Research.pdf. 
This is an increase from 2008, when 1,037 primates were used in painful procedures, but 
their pain was not alleviated. ANIMAL & PLANT  HEALTH  INSPECTION  SERV., U.S. 
DEP’T OF  AGRIC., ANNUAL  REPORT  ANIMAL  USAGE BY  FISCAL  YEAR, PAIN  TYPE: 
TOTAL 2 (2011), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/efoia/down 
loads/2008_Animals_Used_In_Research.pdf.  In 2009, of the approximate one million 
animals used in research, 76,441 were used in painful procedures, but their pain was not 
alleviated because pain relieving drugs would have interfered with or compromised the 
research. PAIN TYPE: WITH PAIN, NO DRUGS 2009, supra. In 2009, there were 26,758 
primates that were used in painful procedures and received pain relieving drugs; a total 
of 354,853 animals were used in painful procedures and received pain relieving drugs. 
ANIMAL & PLANT  HEALTH  INSPECTION  SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF  AGRIC., ANNUAL  RE­
855 
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The use of primates in laboratory research5 is supported by his­
torical and legal precedent.  The purpose of the Laboratory Animal 
Welfare Act (LAWA), the first federal law protecting animals used 
in laboratory research, was, in relevant part, “to insure that certain 
animals intended for use in research facilities are provided humane 
care and treatment.”6  Designated as property, animals are per­
ceived, by some, as voiceless “things.”7  Primates, however, have 
emotional, social, and intellectual lives: they think, communicate, 
learn, have memories, grieve, empathize, and suffer.8  And despite 
widespread agreement that some primates are intelligent, emo­
tional, social beings that deserve some level of protection,9 there is 
PORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR, PAIN TYPE: WITH PAIN, WITH DRUGS 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/efoia/downloads/2009_Animals_ 
Used_In_Research.pdf. 
5. Although this Note is primarily focused on primates in laboratories, primates 
are also confined and used in zoos, for exhibition in circuses, and for entertainment in 
television, commercials, and movies.  The film Any Which Way You Can, for example, 
“led to the death of Clyde, the orangutan who was [Clint] Eastwood’s sidekick.”  Lor­
raine L. Fischer, Note, “No Animals Were Harmed . . .”: Protecting Chimpanzees From 
Cruelty Behind the Curtain, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 405, 416 (2005) (“Clyde 
was essentially beaten to death by his trainer for not paying attention.”). 
6. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, § 1, 80 Stat. 350, 350 
(1966) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006)) (emphasis added); see also 
Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131. 
7. See, e.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE  LAW 166 
(2005); STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE  CAGE: TOWARD  LEGAL  RIGHTS FOR  ANI­
MALS 4 (2000) [hereinafter RATTLING THE  CAGE]; Steven M. Wise, The Legal 
Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 471 (1996) [hereinaf­
ter The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals] (tracing the historical origins of ani­
mals’ legal status as things). 
8. See, e.g., Steven M. Wise, The Entitlement of Chimpanzees to the Common Law 
Writs of Habeas Corpus and De Homine Replegiando, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
219, 227 (2007) [hereinafter The Entitlement of Chimpanzees]; Adam Kolber, Note, 
Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and Other Apes, 54 STAN. 
L. REV. 163, 171-74 (2001); The Gorilla Foundation, Koko’s Mourning for Michael, 
KOKO.ORG (Aug. 2, 2002), http://www.koko.org/world/mourning_koko.html. A discus­
sion of the intellectual, emotional, and social lives of other animals is beyond the scope 
of this Note. 
9. Congress has found that “[g]reat apes are highly intelligent and social animals 
and research laboratory environments involving invasive research cannot meet their 
complex social and psychological needs.”  Great Ape Protection Act, S. 3694, 111th 
Cong. (2010); Great Ape Protection Act, H.R. 1326, 111th Cong. (2009).  According to 
a 2005 public opinion poll, “4 out of 5 (83 percent) of the U.S. public recognize chim­
panzees as highly intelligent, social individuals who have an extensive capacity to com­
municate.” U.S. SENATE, DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
EDUCATION, AND  RELATED  AGENCIES  APPROPRIATIONS FOR  FISCAL  YEAR 2007: 
WRITTEN  TESTIMONY OF  NONDEPARTMENTAL  WITNESSES  BEFORE THE  SENATE  SUB­
COMMITTEE OF THE  COMMITTEE ON  APPROPRIATIONS (2006) (statement of Project 
R&R), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg59104229/pdf/CHRG­
109shrg59104229.pdf.  According to a 2001 poll, eighty-five percent of Americans “be­
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inadequate protective legislation.10  Thus, every day in the United 
States, nonhuman primates suffer physical and mental anguish that 
human primates witness, are complicit in, or declare necessary to 
advance the quality of human life. 
A common justification cited for using animals in research is 
that it is necessary to advance scientific knowledge, which will en­
sure human health and safety.11  This argument rests on the belief 
that harm to animals must be balanced against human benefit. This 
Note rejects that perspective because speciesism12 tips the scale in 
favor of human interests at the expense of animal welfare.  As this 
Note will illustrate through its examination of the Animal Welfare 
Act,13 this balancing results in some animals being subjected to 
painful and distressing procedures. 
One justification cited for using primates in laboratory re­
search is their genetic likeness to humans.14  Primates, however, 
share more than genetics with humans.  In the 1970s, a pioneering 
group of primates learned American Sign Language from pri­
matologist Roger Fouts.15  Some of these chimpanzees, among 
lieve . . . that chimpanzees have ‘complex social, intellectual, and emotional lives.’  Most 
(fifty-one percent) believe chimpanzees should be ‘treated similar to children, with a 
guardian to look after their interests,’ as opposed to being treated either as human 
adults (nine percent) or as property (twenty-three percent).” The Legal Thinghood of 
Nonhuman Animals, supra note 7, at 239 (citations omitted). See infra Part I (chimpan- R 
zees and gorillas demonstrate they have the capacity to learn sign language); Part I 
(gorillas grieve the loss of their companions); Part I (rhesus monkeys recall memory). 
10. See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159. 
11. See, e.g., David R. Schmahmann & Lori J. Polacheck, The Case Against Rights 
for Animals, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 747, 755-60 (1995). Contra C. RAY GREEK 
& JEAN SWINGLE GREEK, SACRED COWS AND GOLDEN GEESE: THE HUMAN COST OF 
EXPERIMENTS ON ANIMALS (2000) (challenging the belief that animal research is neces­
sary and beneficial to humans, and illuminating the disadvantages and dangers). 
12. Speciesism is “discrimination based on species” that relies on the assumption 
that humans are superior to nonhuman animals. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S  COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 1198 (11th ed. 2003) [hereinafter MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S]. 
13. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159. 
14. For a discussion of chimpanzee and human genome comparison see, for ex­
ample, The Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium, Initial Sequence of the 
Chimpanzee Genome and Comparison with the Human Genome, 437 NATURE 69 (Sept. 
1, 2005), available at http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/animals_laboratories/ 
chimpanzee_research/human_chimpanzee_genome.pdf; see also Bueckner v. Hamel, 
886 S.W.2d 368, 377 (Tex. App. 1994) (Andell, J., concurring) (“Scientific research has 
provided a wealth of understanding to us that we cannot rightly ignore. We now know 
that mammals share with us a great many emotive and cognitive characteristics, and 
that the higher primates are very similar to humans neurologically and genetically.”). 
15. See generally ROGER FOUTS & STEPHEN TUKEL MILLS, NEXT OF KIN (1997) 
(describing his personal and professional experience with Washoe, the first chimpanzee 
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them Booee and Bruno, were sold in the 1980s to a biomedical re­
search facility, the New York Laboratory for Experimental 
Medicine and Surgery in Primates (LEMSIP), for hepatitis re­
search.16  At LEMSIP, 
each chimp was locked in a solitary cage that was five by five by 
six feet—the size of a coat closet. The steel-bar-bottom box hung 
from the ceiling, like a birdcage, dangling above the floor so that 
the chimp’s feces could drop through the cage onto plastic sheets 
below.  There were two rows of these hanging cages, facing each 
other across a walkway.  The chimps could see one another and 
call—or sign—to their friends, but there was no group contact or 
access to the outdoors . . . . The entire facility was designed to 
make it easier for the workers to have access to the chimps’ 
blood.17 
Visitors reported that the chimpanzees continued to sign and asked 
the laboratory technicians “for food, drinks, cigarettes, and the keys 
to their cages.”18  When a student of Fouts visited, Bruno signed 
“KEY OUT.”19  He clearly communicated that he wanted out of 
the cage he was confined in.20  Bruno, unfortunately, died at 
LEMSIP.21 
Booee was spared the same fate. Thirteen years after Booee 
and Fouts were separated, ABC News 20/20 aired a program called 
The Great Ape Project, which was about the ethics of using chim­
panzees in biomedical research.22  “Millions of viewers watch[ed], 
detailing chimpanzees’ intellectual and emotional capacity; and drawing attention to the 
cruel imprisonment they face in laboratories). 
16. Id. at 283-84; The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, supra note 7, at R 
280; see also NEW ENGLAND ANTI-VIVISECTION SOC’Y, LEMSIP, PROJECT R&R: RE­
LEASE & RESTITUTION FOR CHIMPANZEES IN U.S. LABORATORIES, www.releasechimps. 
org/labs/labs-closed/lemsip/ (last visited June 11, 2011). 
17. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 283-84. R 
18. Id. at 284. 
19. Id. at 354. 
20. The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, supra note 7, at 280. Feminist R 
theorists Catharine A. MacKinnon and Josephine Donovan are among those who have 
noted that animals are clearly communicating their dissent to human exploitation. 
Josephine Donovan, Animal Rights and Feminist Theory, 15 SIGNS 350, 375 (1990) (“We 
should not kill, eat, torture, and exploit animals because they do not want to be so 
treated, and we know that.  If we listen we can hear them.”); Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Of Mice and Men: A Feminist Fragment on Animal Rights, in ANIMAL  RIGHTS 270 
(Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum, eds. 2004) (“[A]nimals dissent from human 
hegemony . . . .  They vote with their feet by running away.  They bite back, scream in 
alarm, withhold affection, approach warily, fly and swim off.”). 
21. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 358. R 
22. Id. at 353. The Great Ape Project aired on May 5, 1995. Id. at 356. 
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overwhelmed, as Booee recognize[d] and ecstatically greet[ed] Dr. 
Fouts.”23  After the show aired, donations from viewers flooded 
into ABC to fund Booee’s retirement.24  Reflecting on the 20/20 
show, Fouts stated, “For most people it was their very first glimpse 
into this secretive world, and they were outraged to see a thinking, 
loving, signing chimpanzee dangling in a cage without companion­
ship or comfort.”25  Five months later, as a result of massive public 
outcry, Booee and eight other chimpanzees were released to a non­
profit wildlife sanctuary in California.26  In contrast to their living 
quarters at LEMSIP, Booee and the eight other chimpanzees’ new 
home had “large, airy, and sunlit rooms with sagebrush views. 
There [we]re climbing ropes, and enrichment activities, including 
music, books, television, magazines, and toys.”27  These chimpan­
zees were retired to a sanctuary because the public demanded it. 
Public awareness about the treatment of animals used in re­
search facilities is a powerful source of change. The passage of the 
LAWA,28 the predecessor of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), for 
example, was largely influenced by the public’s response to media 
about the horrific conditions dogs were kept in before being sold to 
research facilities and laboratories.29  Subsequent amendments to 
the AWA were similarly driven by public pressure.30  As public 
awareness has increased about the treatment of animals in research 
facilities, the public has demanded legislative change.  Congress, 
however, has responded by passing legislation that while accounting 
for competing goals only “symbolic[ally]”31 protects animals’ 
welfare. 
23. New England Anti-Vivisection Soc’y, A Chronology of Key Events in the Sci­
entific Use of Chimpanzees in the U.S., PROJECT R&R: RELEASE & RESTITUTION FOR 
CHIMPANZEES IN U.S. LABORATORIES, http://www.releasechimps.org/pdfs/chronology­
of-key-events.pdf (last visited June 11, 2011); see also FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at R 
356.  Fouts, reflecting on the reunion, stated, “Thirteen years in a hellhole and he’s still 
forgiving, still guileless.  Booee still loved me, in spite of everything that humans had 
done to him.” Id. 
24. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 356. R 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 356-57. 
27. Id. at 357. 
28. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966) (cur­
rent version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006)). 
29. See Stan Wayman, Concentration Camps for Dogs, LIFE, Feb. 4, 1966, at 23­
29; see also BERNARD UNTI, PROTECTING ALL ANIMALS: A FIFTY-YEAR HISTORY OF 
THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES 71 (2004). 
30. See infra notes 121-141 and accompanying text. R 
31. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 208-11. R 
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Historically, the treatment of animals was largely visible “and 
thus judged by other humans.”32  Today, a huge obstacle that the 
animal law community faces is that people do not know what goes 
on behind the closed doors of research facilities.  “[H]arm done to 
animals is rendered invisible for most people . . . by massive ideo­
logical screening that shields them from the suffering animal in the 
laboratory . . . .”33  David Favre, law professor, argues that “[t]he 
public would never support what happens to animals today, and for 
that reason, more and more animals are hidden away under condi­
tions of which the public is not aware.”34  Wayne Pacelle, president 
and CEO of the Humane Society of the United States, commenting 
on a recent undercover investigation at the New Iberia Research 
Center of the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, stated, 
The only reason that this torment and lifetime captivity of chimps 
is occurring at this lab is because the public doesn’t know.  If they 
could see the behavior of Sturling [a twenty-one year old chim­
panzee who has been permanently removed from research be­
cause he has stress-induced psychosis] and the emotional trauma 
that he’s gone through, and if they could see what’s happening to 
these other chimps, any decent person would not tolerate it and 
they would demand an end.35 
Public awareness about the treatment of animals in research facili­
ties is essential to ending their confinement. Thus, the areas of in­
adequate protection and contradictory legislative language must be 
brought to light. 
Whether a particular social movement is embraced or rejected 
by an individual is, in part, a result of the information available to 
that individual.  An individual’s well of knowledge shapes her 
moral and ethical ideology.  The moral and ethical beliefs of a soci­
ety shape its laws.  “[T]he law evolves from the way society thinks 
32. David Favre, Integrating Animal Interests into our Legal System, 10 ANIMAL 
L. 87, 91 (2004). 
33. THE FEMINIST CARE TRADITION IN ANIMAL ETHICS 3 (Josephine Donovan & 
Carol J. Adams, eds. 2007). 
34. Favre, supra note 32, at 91. R 
35. Primate Investigation, Undercover Investigation at Research Lab, HUMANE 
SOC’Y OF THE U.S., 6:10-6:32 (2009), http://hsus.feedroom.com/?fr_story=478975d8a33d 
5737fb8cb89030361b7fda24a9d9&rf=rss (“February 2009: An undercover investigation 
by the Humane Society of the United States reveals psychological suffering of primates 
in research laboratories.”).  Individuals in the animal welfare, rights, and law commu­
nity are sometimes witness to disturbing visual and audio evidence of animal suffering 
on a regular basis.  For an analysis of the trauma experienced by those working in the 
field, see Taimie L. Bryant, Trauma, Law, and Advocacy For Animals, 1 J. ANIMAL L. 
& ETHICS 63 (2006). 
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and behaves.  Thus, when public attitudes change so does the law. 
Nevertheless, this change is often slow because the forces of conser­
vatism are often stronger in the short term than those of reform.”36 
When the majority of society recognizes their moral obligation to 
treat animals with compassion, dignity, and respect, the law will re­
flect that commitment to protect them. 
This Note will discuss the social movement to confer legal pro­
tections and rights on animals in an effort to end their suffering in 
laboratories from invasive research, and will argue that primates,37 
in particular, should be retired to sanctuaries where they will be 
guaranteed a right to dignity and a life free from confinement and 
torture.38  Part I will reveal a glimpse of the range of research con­
ducted on primates.  In addition, Part I will offer examples of pri­
mates’ intellectual abilities and emotional capacities.  Part II will 
take account of competing theory—animal welfare theory, animal 
rights theory, and feminist animal care theory—and will trace the 
evolution of protective legislation.  Part II will also consider the sta­
tus of animals as property, legal personhood, and legal standing as a 
means of gaining access to the courts to enforce protective legisla­
tion.  Part III will compare evolving societal mindsets in the context 
of the women’s rights movement and the animal welfare and rights 
movement.  In addition, Part III will analyze protective legislation, 
specifically provisions of the AWA that relate to painful laboratory 
research.  And Part III will conclude that current protective legisla­
tion is human-focused, inadequate, and wrought with 
contradictions. 
36. Valdelane Azevedo Clayton, A Habeas Corpus on Behalf of a Chimpanzee, 
ANIMALLAW.INFO (citation omitted), http://www.animallaw.info/nonus/pleadings/ 
pb_pdf/Habeas%20Corpus%20on%20Behalf%20of%20a%20Chimp%20Rev2.pdf 
(last visited June 11, 2011) (translation of Suiça’s habeas petition) (pages not 
numbered). 
37. The focus of this Note on primates, and great apes in particular, is a recogni­
tion by the author of the forces of conservatism.  In light of this, primates are most 
likely the first animals to be freed from invasive research.  A discussion of ending the 
exploitation of other animals in laboratories is beyond the scope of this Note. 
38. Dignity is defined as “the quality or state of being worthy, honored, or es­
teemed.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra note 12, at 350. This Note understands dignity R 
as being honored and treated with respect by being given autonomy and control over 
one’s physical being.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines torture as “[t]he infliction of in­
tense pain to the body or mind to punish, to extract a confession or information, or to 
obtain sadistic pleasure.” BLACK’S  LAW  DICTIONARY 1627 (9th ed. 2009).  Merriam-
Webster defines torture as “anguish of body or mind.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra 
note 12, at 1320.  This Note understands torture as the infliction of intense pain to the R 
body or mind of an animal to extract information.  Information, in this context, is scien­
tific knowledge extracted from the bodies of animals. 
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This Note aims to illuminate that the AWA, as currently en­
acted and administratively enforced, values human interests over, 
and ironically at the expense of, animal welfare. This Note suggests 
that ending painful and distressing laboratory research requires 
deconstructing speciesist ideology that legitimizes the use of ani­
mals in research and cultivating compassion through awareness, 
which in turn should effect change in the law. 
I. NONHUMAN PRIMATES USED IN RESEARCH ARE
 
INTELLIGENT, EMOTIONAL, SOCIAL BEINGS
 
Primates39 have been used in a wide range of painful and 
distressing behavioral studies, medical research, and phar­
maceutical experiments such as studies on drug addiction,40 
maternal and sensory deprivation,41 the effect of space tra­
39. Macaques, in particular the rhesus monkey, an Old World monkey native to 
Asia, are the most commonly used primate in laboratory research in the United States. 
Questions and Answers About Monkeys Used in Research, THE HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE 
U.S., Sept. 28, 2009, http://www.humanesociety.org/animals/monkeys/qa/questions_ 
answers.html#What_types_of_monkeys_are_most_frequentl; see also Non-Human Pri­
mates Used in Research, AMERICAN ANTI-VIVISECTION SOC’Y, http://www.aavs.org/site/ 
c.bkLTKfOSLhK6E/b.6456925/k.63CB/Nonhuman_Primates_Used_in_Research.htm 
(last visited June 11, 2011).  In addition, marmosets, squirrel monkeys, and tamarins are 
among those species frequently used in research. Questions and Answers About 
Monkeys Used in Research, supra. 
40. See, e.g., Lori Whitten, Low Dopamine Receptor Availability May Promote 
Cocaine Addiction, NAT’L  INST. ON  DRUG  ABUSE (Apr. 2009), http://drugabuse.gov/ 
NIDA_notes/NNvol22N3/Low.html.  Harvard University, for example, has conducted 
numerous studies on cocaine addiction using primates. See Bertha K. Madras, et al., 
Dopamine Systems in Primate Brain: Addiction, Parkinson’s Disease and Attention Defi­
cit Hyperactivity Disorder, HARVARD DEP’T OF PSYCHIATRY, http://www.hms.harvard. 
edu/psych/redbook/redbook-basicresearch-neuropharmacology-02.htm (last visited 
June 11, 2011) (current research ongoing at Harvard); Roger D. Spealman & James K. 
Rowlett, Nonhuman Primate Models of Addiction: Biological Basis and Experimental 
Therapeutics, HARVARD  DEP’T OF  PSYCHIATRY, http://www.hms.harvard.edu/psych/ 
redbook/redbook-addictions-09.htm (last visited June 11, 2011) (current research ongo­
ing at Harvard). 
41. Britches’ Story, BRITCHES.ORG, http://www.britches.org.uk/story.asp (last vis­
ited June 11, 2011).  For example, Britches, a stump-tailed macaque monkey, was sepa­
rated from his mother at birth to study maternal deprivation, and his eyelids were sewn 
shut to study sensory deprivation and blindness. Id.; see also Britches, ANIMAL LIBERA­
TION  FRONT, http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/Actions-USA/Britches. 
htm (last visited June 11, 2011); Britches’ Story, PETA, http://www.peta.org/tv/videos/ 
animal-experimentation/britches-story.aspx (last visited June 11, 2011). In 1985, when 
Britches was five weeks old, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), an animal rights 
group, broke into the University of California, Riverside where Britches was confined 
and released him. Britches’ Story, BRITCHES.ORG, supra; see also Britches, supra; 
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vel,42 radiation, and brain damage;43 toxicology;44 infectious dis-
ease;45 and age-related research.46  Such use in research has led to 
the decline of the population of some species of primates. 
One hundred years ago, an estimated five million chimpanzees 
lived free in Africa.47  Today, however, chimpanzee “populations 
have been decimated as humans have destroyed African tropical 
forests, hunted . . . chimpanzees for food, and captured thousands 
of chimpanzees for sale to American and European laboratories, 
found Britches alone in a cage with bandages around his eyes and a sonar
 
device attached to his head that emitted a high-pitched screech every few min­
utes.  He was clinging to a device, covered in towelling [sic], that had two fake
 
nipples attached, apparently intended to serve as a surrogate mother.
 
Britches’ Story, BRITCHES.ORG, supra; see also Britches, supra; Britches’ Story, PETA, 
supra. 
42. See Tara Gray, A Brief History of Animals in Space, NASA HISTORY  PRO­
GRAM OFFICE (Aug. 2, 2004), http://history.nasa.gov/animals.html. In the 1950s, “[t]he 
United States Air Force create[d] a breeding colony of 65 wild-caught chimpanzees for 
use in the space program.” A History of Advocating for Chimpanzees Used in Research, 
THE  HUMANE  SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.humanesociety.org/ 
issues/chimpanzee_research/timelines/history.html.  On January 31, 1961, Ham, a chim­
panzee, “paved the way for the successful launch of America’s first human astronaut, 
Alan B. Shepard, Jr.”; and on November 29, 1961, Enos, also a chimpanzee, paved the 
way for astronaut John Glenn. Gray, supra; see also Chimpanzees: An Unnatural His­
tory, Video: Chimps in the Space Program, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/ 
episodes/chimpanzees-an-unnatural-history/video-chimps-in-the-space-program/4468/ 
(last visited June 11, 2011); Project Mercury–Launching and Recovery of Mercury Cap­
sule with the Chimpanzee Named Ham on Board, NASA IMAGES (Feb. 9, 1961), http:// 
www.nasaimages.org/luna/servlet/detail/nasaNAS~13~13~70215~175392:PROJECT­
MERCURY—-LAUNCHING-AND-REC (last visited June 11, 2011). See generally 
NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., RESULTS OF THE PROJECT MERCURY BALLIS­
TIC AND  ORBITAL  CHIMPANZEE  FLIGHTS (1963), http://history.nasa.gov/SP39 
Chimpanzee.pdf (last visited June 11, 2011) (detailing the training and evaluation of the 
chimpanzees used in the Mercury Chimpanzee Program).  Most of the surviving chim­
panzees used in the space program were later leased out by the Air Force for biomedi­
cal research.  New England Anti-Vivisection Soc’y, Air & Space, PROJECT R&R: 
RELEASE & RESTITUTION FOR  CHIMPANZEES IN U.S. LABORATORIES, http://www. 
releasechimps.org/harm-suffering/research-history/air-space/ (last visited June 11, 
2011). 
43. See infra notes 138-139 and accompanying text. R 
44. See Chimpanzee Facts, THE  CHIMPANZEE & HUMAN  COMM’N  INST., http:// 
www.cwu.edu/~cwuchci/faq.html (last visited June 11, 2011); Non-Human Primates 
Used in Research, supra note 39. R 
45. See Chimpanzee Facts, supra note 44.  For example, chimpanzees have been R 
used for hepatitis research, see supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (Booee and R 
Bruno at LEMPIS), and AIDS research, see Chimpanzee Facts, supra note 44; infra R 
notes 56-62 and accompanying text (Jerom). R 
46. See Non-Human Primates Used in Research, supra note 39. R 
47. RATTLING THE  CAGE, supra note 7, at 6; Chimpanzee Facts, supra note 44 R 
(“[C]himpanzees are indigenous only to Africa.”). 
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circuses, and zoos.”48  As a result, chimpanzees are an endangered 
species;49 their population has dwindled and it is “estimate[d] that 
there are only 80,000 [to] 130,000 chimpanzees left in the entire 
world.”50 
“In the wild, chimpanzees live in very diverse social groups and 
travel several miles in one day.”51  In contrast, in the laboratory, 
they often “live alone in cold, metal cages approximately the size of 
a closet.”52  Although they may see and hear other primates, they 
may be denied their physical contact and companionship.53  Hous­
ing chimpanzees alone “can cause severe problems such as depres­
sion, heightened aggression, frustration and even self-mutilation.”54 
Life in a laboratory is one of isolation, deprivation, boredom, fear, 
and suffering. 
Most chimpanzees in laboratories today are warehoused—con­
fined, but not used in procedures.55  Many of the chimpanzees cur­
rently warehoused —the surplus—were bred for AIDS research.56 
Chimpanzees, however, do not develop the symptoms of AIDS af­
ter being infected with HIV as humans do.57  Jerom was one of the 
many lives wasted discovering this.58  Jerom was infected with three 
strains of HIV before he was five years old; he was euthanized in 
48. Chimpanzee Facts, supra note 44; see also RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 7, R 
at 5-6. 
49. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). Wild chimpan­
zees are listed as an “endangered” species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA); 
whereas, captive chimpanzees are classified as a “threatened species.” Id.  §§ 1532­
1533.  This classification protects chimpanzees born in the wild, but permits laboratory 
research on chimpanzees bred in captivity. 
50. Chimpanzee Facts, supra note 44. R 
51. Questions and Answers about Chimpanzees Used in Research, THE HUMANE 
SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/chimpan­
zee_research/qa/questions_answers.html [hereinafter Chimpanzees Used in Research]. 
52. Id. 
53. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 284. R 
54. Chimpanzees Used in Research, supra note 51; see also infra Part III.C (dis- R 
cussing inadequate environmental enhancements to promote the psychological well­
being of rhesus monkeys). 
55. Chimpanzees Used in Research, supra note 51. R 
56. Nancy R. Hoffman & Robun C. McGinnis, 2007-2008 Legislative Review, 15 
ANIMAL L. 265, 269 (2009); New England Anti-Vivisection Soc’y, HIV/AIDS Debacle, 
PROJECT R&R: RELEASE & RESTITUTION FOR CHIMPANZEES IN U.S. LABORATORIES, 
http://www.releasechimps.org/harm-suffering/research-current/hivaids-debacle/ (last 
visited June 11, 2011). 
57. Hoffman & McGinnis, supra note 56, at 269-70; HIV/AIDS Debacle, supra R 
note 56. R 
58. See RATTLING THE  CAGE, supra note 7, at 1-2; HIV/AIDS Debacle, supra R 
note 56. R 
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1996, just “shy of his fourteenth birthday.”59  He lived in “a large, 
windowless, gray concrete box, one of eleven bleak steel-and-con­
crete cells 9 feet by 11 feet by 8.5 feet” in the Chimpanzee Infec­
tious Disease Building at the Yerkes Regional Primate Research 
Center (Yerkes).60  Rachel Weiss, a former animal care technician 
at Yerkes, cared for Jerom in the final six months of his life as an 
“AIDS-like illness” ravaged his body.61  Weiss, reflecting on her 
time with Jerom, stated, 
As is often the case with experiments on live animals, Jerom suf­
fered for much of his illness without being given medical treatment 
to relieve his pain or misery, because doing so would have inter­
fered with the course of the experiment . . . .  Instead of a proud 
figure, he was lean and gaunt, his hair dull, his skin pale, his eyes 
sunken from wasting and bright with fear and fever.  He suffered 
in almost every way a caged chimpanzee can suffer, and then he 
died.62 
Some chimpanzees, however, have been spared the fate of 
those in the laboratory.  Washoe, for example, was the first chim­
panzee to communicate with humans using American Sign Lan­
guage (ASL).63  She was abducted from Africa as an infant and 
brought to the United States for use in the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration’s (NASA) space chimpanzee program.64 
Instead of being used in NASA’s program, Washoe was adopted 
and raised by Allen and Beatrix Gardner in their home until she 
was five years old, when she was relocated to a primate institute 
that housed other chimpanzees.65  In 2007, at the approximate age 
59. RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 7, at 1; see also HIV/AIDS Debacle, supra R 
note 56. R 
60. RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 7, at 2. R 
61. HIV/AIDS Debacle, supra note 56 (internal citations omitted). Jerom’s R 
“AIDS-like illness” was an exception to other HIV research done on chimpanzees; it 
was the result of being infected with multiple HIV strains, which is not representative of 
the infection and progression of the illness in humans. Id. 
62. HIV/AIDS Debacle, supra note 56 (emphasis added); see also  RATTLING THE R 
CAGE, supra note 7, at 1-2. R 
63. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 4; Roger S. Fouts & Deborah H. Fouts, R 
Chimpanzees’ Use of Sign Language, in THE  GREAT  APE  PROJECT 28-41 (Paola 
Cavalieri & Peter Singer, eds. 1993), available at http://www.animal-rights-library.com/ 
texts-m/fouts01.pdf; Kolber, supra note 8, at 172. See generally FOUTS & MILLS, supra R 
note 15 (detailing the events of Washoe’s life); Meet Washoe, FRIENDS OF  WASHOE, R 
http://www.friendsofwashoe.org/ (last visited June 11, 2011). 
64. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 4; Chimpanzee Facts, supra note 44; Meet R 
Washoe, supra note 63; see also Gray, supra note 42. R 
65. Fouts & Fouts, supra note 63; Kolber, supra note 8, at 172. R 
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of forty-two, Washoe died at a primate sanctuary after a short 
illness.66 
Washoe’s “accomplishments, along with those of her African 
cousins, have served as a small flame in the dark halls of human 
ignorance.”67  She and other chimpanzees have 
demonstrate[d] that they have complex minds, are self-conscious 
and self-aware, exhibit some or all of the elements of a theory of 
mind (they know what other chimpanzees see or know what 
other chimpanzees know), understand symbols, construct compli­
cated societies, transmit culture, use a human language or sophis­
ticated language-like communication system, and engage in such 
complicated mental operations as deception, pretending, imita­
tion, and insightful solving of difficult problems.68 
Koko, a gorilla, was born in 1971 and learned sign-language 
when she was one year old.69  She has a vocabulary of over 1,000 
signs, and she understands approximately 2,000 English words.70 
“Koko has a tested IQ of between 70 and 95 on a human scale, 
where 100 is considered ‘normal.’”71  Beyond her intellectual abil­
ity, Koko has demonstrated a range of emotional responses. Koko 
had a pet cat she named “All Ball” who was hit by a car and 
killed.72  She mourned when she was given the news.73  Dr. 
Francine Patterson, recalling Koko’s reaction to All Ball’s death, 
stated, 
66. Meet the Family: Washoe’s Biography, FRIENDS OF  WASHOE, http://www. 
friendsofwashoe.org/washoe_bio.shtml (last visited June 11, 2011).  The average lifes­
pan of a chimpanzee is forty years; in captivity they can live up to sixty years, in the wild 
fifty-three. Learn About Chimpanzees, FRIENDS OF  WASHOE, http://www.friendsof 
washoe.org/learn_about_chimpanzees.shtml (last visited June 11, 2011). 
67. Fouts & Fouts, supra note 63, at 31. R 
68. The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, supra note 7, at 227.  In 2007, a R 
study conducted to measure short-term memory compared the ability of young chim­
panzees and human adults: “the chimps won.”  Malcolm Ritter, Young Chimp 
Outscores College Students in Memory Test, NAT’L  GEOGRAPHIC  NEWS, Dec. 3, 
2007, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/12/071203-AP-chimp-memory. 
html.  “That challenges the belief of many people, including a number of scientists, that 
‘humans are superior to chimpanzees in all cognitive functions’ . . . .” Id. (quoting 
researcher Tetsuro Matsuzawa of Kyoto University). 
69. The Gorilla Foundation, Koko’s World, KOKO.ORG, http://www.koko.org/ 
world/ (last visited June 11, 2011). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. FRANCINE  PATTERSON, KOKO’S  KITTEN (Scholastic, ed., 1985) (pages not 
numbered); Kolber, supra note 8, at 172. R 
73. PATTERSON, supra note 72; Kolber, supra note 8, at 172. R 
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I told her that Ball had been hit by a car; she would not see him 
again. 
Koko did not respond.  I thought she didn’t understand, so I 
left the trailer. 
Ten minutes later, I heard Koko cry. It was her distress 
call—a loud, long series of high-pitched hoots . . . . 
Three days later, Koko and I had a conversation about Ball. 
“Do you want to talk about your kitty?”  I asked. 
“Cry,” Koko signed. 
“Can you tell me more about it?”  I asked. 
“Blind,” she signed. 
“We don’t see him anymore, do we?  What happened to 
your kitty?”  I asked. 
“Sleep cat,” Koko signed. 
A few weeks later, Koko saw a picture of a gray tabby who 
looked very much like Ball.  She pointed to the picture and 
signed, “Cry, sad, frown.”74 
Koko also grieved after her companion of twenty-four years, 
Michael, died.75  She “uttered frequent, mournful cries, particularly 
at night.”76  And, in what appeared to be an effort to alleviate her 
emotional distress, she requested, in sign language, a nightlight be 
left on at night.77  The loss of her relationships with All Ball and 
Michael had a significant emotional impact on Koko, which she 
communicated to her human guardians.78 
Rhesus monkeys, the most commonly used primate in labora­
tory research in the United States, have also demonstrated their 
capacity for complex learning and intelligence.  In a recent study at 
Yale School of Medicine, researchers played “rock, paper, scissors” 
with rhesus monkeys, which demonstrates rhesus monkeys’ capacity 
for disappointment and regret.79  “[E]ach time a monkey lost, it was 
more likely in the next round to use the gesture that would have 
won in the previous one ( . . . for instance, if the researcher’s rock 
beat the monkey’s scissors, the monkey was more likely to throw a 
rock in the next round).”80  According to researchers, this “suggests 
74. PATTERSON, supra note 72. R 
75. Koko’s Mourning for Michael, supra note 8. R 
76. Kolber, supra note 8, at 174; Koko’s Mourning for Michael, supra note 8. R 
77. Kolber, supra note 8, at 174; Koko’s Mourning for Michael, supra note 8. R 
78. Koko’s Mourning for Michael, supra note 8. R 
79. Meredith Melnick, Monkeys, Like Humans, Make Bad Choices and Regret 
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the monkeys were capable of analyzing past results and imagining a 
different outcome.”81  In another recent study at Yerkes National 
Primate Research Center rhesus monkeys demonstrated “that they 
are able to recall things from recent memory.”82 
Primates have repeatedly demonstrated that they are intelli­
gent, emotional, social beings.  Thus, they deserve legislative pro­
tection that retires them from laboratories to sanctuaries where 
they will be guaranteed a right to dignity and a life free from con­
finement and torture in laboratories. 
II. EVOLVING THEORY, PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION &
 
ACCESS TO THE COURTS
 
The animal welfare movement dates back to the late 1800s.83 
Societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals were first estab­
lished in the United States in the 1860s.84  In 1876, Britain passed 
the first national law that regulated the use of animals in experi­
mental research, the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876.85  Although 
the United States Congress conducted hearings on vivisection in 
1900,86 federal legislation regulating the use of animals in laborato­
ries was not passed until 1966.87  Despite gains in animal protection 
generally and primate protection specifically, current legislation in­
adequately protects the welfare of animals.  Furthermore, enforce­
ment of protective legislation is hindered by standing requirements. 
And finally, a glance at the international community reveals that 
the United States has been slow to enact legislation protecting pri­
mates, specifically chimpanzees. 
81. Id. 
82. Michael Marshall & Aria Pearson, Monkeys Show Ability to Recall Patterns, 
WASH. POST, May 9, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/science/monkeys­
show-ability-to-remember-things/2011/05/05/AFq1BgdG_story.html. 
83. UNTI, supra note 29, at 1. R 
84. Id.  The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), one of the largest 
animal welfare organizations, was established in 1954. Id. at 3.  “‘The Humane Society 
of the United States opposes and seeks to prevent all use or exploitation of animals that 
causes pain, suffering, or fear.’” Id. (quoting HSUS’s guiding policy). For history of 
the HSUS, see id. at 2-40. 
85. UNTI, supra note 29, at 66; see also FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 190 (noting R 
that the “British legislation . . . tightly controlled [the] use of animals in painful 
experiments”). 
86. See Vivisection: Hearing on the Bill (S. 34) for the Further Prevention of Cru­
elty to Animals in the District of Columbia Before the S. Comm. on the District of Co­
lumbia, 56th Cong. (1900). 
87. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966) (cur­
rent version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006)). 
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A.	 Evolving Theory: Animal Welfare Theory, Animal Rights 
Theory, and Feminist Care Theory 
The social movement to protect the welfare of and confer legal 
rights on animals has grown in the last thirty-five years. This 
growth has paralleled humans’ changing understanding of the inter­
nal lives of animals, especially primates.  Animal welfare and rights 
are topics of social, political, and legal debate that have gained in­
ternational attention.88  And animal law is a rapidly developing 
area of legal academia and practice.89 
In the animal law community, there is a divide between some 
animal welfare theorists and some animal rights theorists. This is 
not, however, a bright line divide, and some theorists take a middle 
ground and recognize the value in advocating for both protective 
legislation and legal rights.  The welfare-rights debate centers 
around whether animals should be better protected or granted legal 
rights.  Problematically, however, during this debate about whether 
there should be bigger cages or no cages, animals remain confined 
in cages. 
Animal welfare theorists are concerned with enforcing and ex­
panding current legislation and conservatively focus their attention 
on preventing animal suffering.  These reformist measures are criti­
cized by some rights theorists as authorizing exploitation.90  Gary L. 
Francione, animal rights legal scholar and professor of law, broadly 
describes animal welfare as “the view that it is morally acceptable, 
at least under some circumstances, to kill animals or subject them to 
suffering as long as precautions are taken to ensure that the animal 
is treated as ‘humanely’ as possible.”91  The Animal Welfare Act,92 
for example, as will be discussed, authorizes exploitation because 
under its provisions animals may be subjected to pain if scientifi­
cally justified.  Although animal welfare advocates’ methods may 
be perceived as authorizing exploitation, their approach currently 
may be the most practical way to address some of the suffering of 
animals presently confined in cages.  However, the inadequacies of 
88. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A Legal/Con­
tractualist Critique, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27, 29 (2009). 
89. Id.  “There are 131 law schools in the U.S. and Canada that have offered a 
course in animal law.” Animal Law Courses, ANIMAL  LEGAL  DEFENSE  FUND, http:// 
aldf.org/userdata_display.php?modin=51 (last visited June 11, 2011). 
90. See, e.g., FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 7.	 R 
91. Id. at 6. 
92. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159. 
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current protective legislation, as will be discussed, illustrate the in­
effectiveness of this approach. 
Animal rights theorists, on the other hand, focus their atten­
tion on granting animals legal rights such as legal standing93 and 
legal personhood.94  “Rights theorists argue that . . . some animals 
possess . . . some of the same rights enjoyed by humans . . . [that is,] 
animals [do not] lose their rights whenever, or just because, humans 
stand to benefit from exploiting animals.”95  Because animal rights 
advocates strive for ending all exploitation of animals, they are 
sometimes criticized as too radical.96  This criticism flows, in part, 
from the reality that granting animals rights will require massive 
economic and social restructuring because the food, clothing, en­
tertainment, and biomedical research industries rely on the legal 
exploitation of animals.97 
An alternative to rights theory is feminist animal care theory.98 
Feminist care theorists emphasize that empathy and compassion are 
essential to deconstructing speciesist ideology.99  Feminist care the­
orists also argue that it is important to consider animals not in rela­
tion to their similarities or differences to human animals, but rather 
to value them for themselves.100  Rights theorists, on the other 
93. See infra Part II.C.3. 
94. See infra Part II.C.2. 
95. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 8.  Steven M. Wise, animal rights attorney and R 
legal scholar, addresses the question of where to draw the line, suggesting a sort of 
hierarchical structure. See generally STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE  LINE: SCIENCE 
AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (2002) (discussion includes great apes, dolphins, 
elephants, and honeybees). 
96. See Taimie L. Bryant, The Bob Barker Gifts to Support Animal Rights Law, 
60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 237, 238 (2010) (“If ‘animal rights’ is understood as the position that 
animals should have rights to prevent humans from exploiting them, the concept can be 
considered ‘radical’ because animal exploitation is so deeply engrained in our 
society.”). 
97. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 253-54. R 
98. See, e.g., THE FEMINIST CARE TRADITION IN ANIMAL ETHICS, supra note 33. R 
99. See generally Josephine Donovan, Feminism and the Treatment of Animals: 
From Care to Dialogue, 31 SIGNS 305 (2006).  The lack of empathy that some humans 
have for animals is arguably a learned behavior.  Brian Luke, Taming Ourselves or Go­
ing Feral? Toward a Nonpatriarchal Metaethic of Animal Liberation, in ANIMALS AND 
WOMEN: FEMINIST  THEORETICAL  EXPLORATIONS 306 (Carol J. Adams & Josephine 
Donovan eds., 1995) (“The ability to harm animals on a daily basis without overwhelm­
ing distress requires an empathic curtailment which must be carefully inculcated.”); see 
also Steven J. Bartlett, Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights: Psychological and 
Conceptual Blocks, 8 ANIMAL L. 143, 154-55 (2002). 
100. Linda Vance, Beyond Just-So Stories: Narrative, Animals, and Ethics, in ANI­
MALS AND  WOMEN: FEMINIST  THEORETICAL  EXPLORATIONS, supra note 99, at 185 R 
(“The goal is not to make us care about animals because they are like us, but to care 
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hand, have a tendency to focus on the similarities between, for ex­
ample, nonhuman primates and human primates. This similarity is 
a hook some rights theorists use to argue why primates should be 
granted rights.  Problematically, this similarity is also a hook that 
advocates for animal research use.101 
Welfare-based and rights-based theory are each valuable. 
Strengthening and passing new protective legislation is important 
because it addresses current suffering of animals.  Attaining legal 
rights for animals is essential for the larger, long-term goal of end­
ing animal exploitation.  In addition, care-based theory has valuable 
insights that should not be rejected because it rests on an emo­
tional, rather than a rational basis. 
B. The Progression of Protective Legislation 
1. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act 
In the 1960s, animal welfare became a salient issue in the 
United States when there was public outrage about the theft and 
sale of companion animals for laboratory research.102 Life maga­
zine’s 1966 photo-essay Concentration Camps for Dogs significantly 
shaped public support of the issue of animal welfare.103  Photogra­
pher Stan Wayman accompanied Frank McMahon, field director of 
the Humane Society of the United States, and Maryland state po­
lice as they raided dog dealer Lester Brown’s property.104  Wayman 
captured horrific images of the neglectful and inhumane conditions 
dogs were kept in before being sold to laboratories.105  Accounts of 
the police raid describe horrendous conditions in which more than 
one hundred dogs were suffering.106  Emaciated dogs were “dis­
eased, numbed by the cold, chained to ramshackle boxes and bar­
rels, jammed into chicken crates and wire pens, and wallowing in 
their own wastes.”107  Some dogs were “too weak to crawl over to 
the iced up cattle entrails strewn about the junkyard for them to 
101. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. R 
102. See, e.g., FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 190. R 
103. Id.; UNTI, supra note 29, at 71; Wayman, supra note 29, at 23-29. R 
104. UNTI, supra note 29, at 71; Wayman, supra note 29, at 23-29. R 
105. UNTI, supra note 29, at 71; Wayman, supra note 29, at 23-29. R 
106. UNTI, supra note 29, at 71; Wayman, supra note 29, at 23-29. R 
107. Animal Abuse Case Details: Dog Found Frozen in Box on Property, PET­
ABUSE.COM, http://www.pet-abuse.com/cases/9039/MD/US/ (last visited June 11, 2011). 
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eat.”108  “Another dog lick[ed] desperately at a dish of water that 
was frozen solid.”109  One “dog [was] frozen inside a box.”110 
Public response to the mistreatment of these dogs was over­
whelming, resulting in “more letters to Life than the magazine had 
received on any other article, and . . . more letters to Congress than 
were sent on issues such as civil rights and the war in Vietnam.”111 
Six months after the publication of the Life magazine photo-essay, 
a House Conference Report recognized that the “conscience and 
concern” of “many thousands of Americans throughout the Na­
tion”112 played a role in the enactment of the Laboratory Animal 
Welfare Act (LAWA),113 now known as the Animal Welfare Act 
(AWA),114 which President Lyndon Johnson signed into law.115 
President Johnson stated at the signing: 
science and research do not compel us to tolerate the kind of 
inhumanity which has been involved in the business of supplying 
stolen animals to laboratories or which is sometimes involved in 
the careless and callous handling of animals in some of our labo­
ratories.  This bill will put an end to these abuses.116 
Although the LAWA was the first federal law regulating any aspect 
of the use of animals in research, it did not regulate the use of ani­
mals during research.117  President Johnson’s statement at the sign­
ing continued, “At the same time the bill does not authorize any 
108. Id.; see also Wayman, supra note 29, at 23-29. R 
109. Wayman, supra note 29, at 27. R 
110. Id. at 26. 
111. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 192.  Congressional representatives received R 
more than 80,000 letters from Americans. UNTI, supra note 29, at 71. R 
112. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1848, at 6 (1966) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://www. 
nal.usda.gov/awic/pubs/AWA2007/confrep_aug1966.pdf. 
113. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966) 
(current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006)). 
114. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159. 
115. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 190; UNTI, supra note 29, at 71. R 
116. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks Upon Signing the Animal Welfare 
Bill, (Aug. 24, 1966), THE  AMERICAN  PRESIDENCY  PROJECT, http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27796. 
117. The LAWA required that the United States Department of Agriculture
 
establish and promulgate standards to govern the humane handling, care,
 
treatment, and transportation of animals by dealers and research facilities . . . .
 
The foregoing shall not be construed as authorizing the Secretary to prescribe
 
standards for the handling, care, or treatment of animals during actual re­
search or experimentation by a research facility as determined by such re­
search facility.
 
Laboratory Animal Welfare Act § 13, 80 Stat. at 352 (emphasis added); see also FRAN­
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sort of interference with actual research or experimentation. They 
just must go on.”118  This statement illustrates that the primary con­
cern of this legislation was not animal welfare. 
Rather than protecting animals, the purpose of the LAWA was, 
in relevant part, “to protect the owners of dogs and cats from theft 
of such pets, [and] to prevent the sale or use of dogs and cats which 
have been stolen.”119  This stated purpose reflects a desire to pro­
tect the property rights of owners of companion animals.  Further 
illustrating this, the LAWA required record keeping regarding “the 
purchase, sale, transportation, identification, and previous owner­
ship of dogs and cats, but not monkeys, guinea pigs, hamsters, or 
rabbits.”120 
2. Animal Welfare Act 
In 1970, the LAWA was amended and renamed the Animal 
Welfare Act (AWA),121 which is currently the primary federal legis­
lation protecting animals.122  The purpose of the AWA is 
(1) to insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or 
for exhibition purposes or for use as pets are provided humane 
care and treatment; (2) to assure the humane treatment of ani­
mals during transportation in commerce; and (3) to protect the 
owners of animals from the theft of their animals by preventing 
the sale or use of animals which have been stolen.123 
The 1970 amendment required, among other things, the use of an­
esthetic, analgesic, or tranquillizing drugs during experimenta­
tion.124 
118. Johnson, supra note 116. R 
119. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act § 1, 80 Stat. at 350; see also S. REP. NO. 89­
1281 (1966), available at http://www.animallaw.info/administrative/adussrep1281_1966. 
htm. 
120. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act § 10, 80 Stat. at 351. 
121. Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560 (current ver­
sion at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006)).  The 1970 amendment expanded the definition of 
“animal.” Id. § 3(g), 84 Stat. at 1561.  In 2002, the 1970 more inclusive definition was 
amended and “animal” was redefined to exclude “birds, rats of the genus Rattus, and 
mice of the genus Mus, bred for use in research.” Farm Security and Rural Investment 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 10301, 116 Stat. 134, 491 (current version at 7 U.S.C. 
§ 2132(g)). 
122. See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143. The Endangered Species Act is 
another source of protection.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006); see supra note 49 (endan- R 
gered versus threatened classifications). 
123. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131. 
124. Animal Welfare Act § 1, 84 Stat. at 1562. This amendment illuminates a 
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In 1976, the AWA was again amended,125 this time driven by 
public concern regarding dog fighting126 and the inhumane treat­
ment and death of animals during transportation due to improper 
shipping containers, exposure to extreme temperatures, and lack of 
ventilation and water.127  A cougar, for example, died several days 
after being left in an 
airless, coffin-like crate in a hot hangar for five hours on a day 
when temperatures soared into the 90’s. The water pipe leading 
into the crate was too narrow and rusty to be usable. The inside 
of the crate was lined with wires, which the cougar tore and 
twisted trying to get out, lacerating her paws in the struggle.128 
Despite USDA resistance,129 the 1976 amendment brought trans­
portation carriers130 and intermediate handlers131 of animals under 
the provisions of the AWA.  It established standards for “[shipping] 
containers, feed, water, rest, ventilation, temperature, and han­
dling” to promote better care for animals during transport.132  In 
addition, it added a new provision that prohibits knowingly spon­
soring, participating, transporting, or using the mail to promote 
fighting of animals.133 
125. Animal Welfare Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, 90 Stat. 417 (current ver­
sion at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159). 
126. In 2007, the AWA was again amended with animal fighting, specifically birds, 
in mind. See Animal Fighting Prohibition Enforcement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110­
22, 121 Stat. 88. 
127. Animal Welfare Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 417. “[Dogs’] crates are frequently 
makeshift, poorly-ventilated and lacking in bedding and water containers. We have 
seen them in airline warehouses, crying and whimpering with the need to relieve them­
selves after having been cooped up for 24 hours or longer.” Animal Welfare Improve­
ment Act of 1975: Hearing on S. 1941, S. 2070, S. 2430 Before the Subcomm. on the Env’t 
of the Comm. of Commerce, 94th Cong. 57 (1975) (statement of Fay Brisk, Director of 
Airport Activities, Washington Humane Society), available at http://lawlibrary.rutgers. 
edu/gdoc/hearings/7/76601708/76601708_1.pdf. 
128. Animal Welfare Improvement Act of 1975, supra note 127, at 59. R 
129. In 1975, the USDA, which is responsible for enforcing the AWA, opposed 
amending the AWA to better protect animals in transit, but instead favored “voluntary 
cooperation” with improved standards of care in transportation. Id. at 43 (statement of 
Dr. Pierre A. Chaloux, Assistant Deputy Administrator, Veterinary Services, Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service, Department of Agriculture). The USDA also op­
posed amendments regarding animal fighting because it believed that this was the re­
sponsibility of the state and local law enforcement agencies and because it lacked “the 
kind of trained manpower and other resources necessary to prohibit animal fights or 
arrest the involved persons.” Id. at 45. 
130. Animal Welfare Act of 1976, 90 Stat. at 418 (current version at 7 U.S.C. 
§ 2132(2)(j) (2008)). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. § 9, 90 Stat. at 419. 
133. Id. § 17, 90 Stat. at 421. 
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Public outrage, in response to two highly publicized cases of 
horrific mistreatment of primates in laboratory research, led to 
Congress again amending the AWA with the passage of the Food 
Security Act of 1985.134  In 1983, the Silver Spring Monkey case 
revealed severe mistreatment of monkeys.135  Alex Pacheco, co­
founder of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), 
documented numerous violations of the AWA while volunteering at 
the Institute for Biological Research in Silver Spring, Maryland, 
leading to the seizure of seventeen monkeys.136  The Silver Spring 
Monkeys were not provided “sufficient food or water, a sanitary 
environment, or adequate veterinary care.”137  And in 1984, the 
Animal Liberation Front, an animal rights group, released video­
tapes that revealed “severe mistreatment of baboons by govern­
ment-funded researchers” at the Head Injury Clinic at the 
134. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, §§ 1751-1759, 99 Stat. 1354, 
1645-50.  This amendment introduced exercise requirements for dogs in research facili­
ties, and a requirement for “a physical environment adequate to promote the psycho­
logical well-being of primates.” Id. § 1752, 99 Stat. at 1650. 
135. Taub v. State, 463 A.2d 819 (Md. 1983); see also Int’l Primate Prot. League v. 
Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986); infra notes 245-250 and R 
accompanying text. 
Twelve of the seventeen monkeys had disabled limbs as a result of surgical
 
interference (deafferentation) when they were juveniles . . . .
 
No one bothered to bandage the monkeys’ injuries properly (on the few
 
occasions when bandages were used at all), and antibiotics were administered
 
only once; no lacerations of self-amputation injuries were ever cleaned. . . .
 
The monkeys also suffered from a variety of wounds that were self-inflicted or
 
inflicted by monkeys grabbing at them from adjoining cages.  I saw dis­
coloured, exposed muscle tissue on their arms. Two monkeys had bones pro­
truding through their flesh.  Several had bitten off their own fingers and had
 
festering stubs . . . .
 
Alex Pacheco & Anna Francione, The Silver Spring Monkeys, in IN DEFENSE OF ANI­
MALS 136-37 (Peter Singer ed., 1985). 
136. See generally Pacheco & Francione, supra note 135, at 136-46. R 
137. Int’l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 936.  “In addition to the tiny, filthy 
cages, Pacheco noted that no one properly bandaged the monkeys limbs, that the 
monkeys went for many days without being fed, that no one cleaned the cages and lab 
rooms regularly, and that Taub never used a [veterinarian].” Marci Messet, They Asked 
for Protection and They Got Policy: International Primate’s Mutilated Monkeys, 21 AK­
RON L. REV. 97, 101 n.51 (1987) (citing Pacheco & Francione, supra note 135, at 136- R 
41).  “When the police went into his laboratory, they discovered monkeys with open 
wounds from self-amputation and a disturbing lack of hygiene, including cages ‘caked 
with feces.’” Id. at 101 n.51 (quoting Karen L. McDonald, Comment, Creating a Pri­
vate Cause of Action Against Abusive Animal Research, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 406 
(1986) (footnotes omitted)). 
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University of Pennsylvania.138  “The tapes showed government-
funded experiments in which baboons were knocked repeatedly on 
their heads without first being properly anesthetized.  Other scenes 
recorded the primates coming out of anesthesia before doctors had 
finished operating on their brains.  The tapes were viewed by mil­
lions of television viewers across the country.”139 
In 1990, another amendment to the AWA was motivated by the 
issue of stolen pets and focused on the use of ex-pets in laborato­
ries.140  This amendment requires shelters to hold all dogs and cats 
for at least five days, allowing time for pet owners to claim their 
pets or for adoption to new homes.141  In some states, after this five-
day window, ex-pets may be sold to research facilities and laborato­
ries.142  This shift from pet to laboratory subject illuminates ani­
mals’ status as things, as property. 
138. Colette L. Adkins Giese, Twenty Years Wasted: Inadequate USDA Regula­
tions Fail to Protect Primate Psychological Well-Being, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 221, 
224-25 (2006). 
139. Joseph Mendelson, III, Should Animals Have Standing? A Review of Stand­
ing Under the Animal Welfare Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 795, 799 & n.38 (1997) 
(citing David Masci, Fighting Over Animal Rights: Has Public Support for the Move­
ment Peaked?, CQ RESEARCHER, Aug. 2, 1996, at 673-96); see also Unnecessary Fuss, 
PETA, http://www.peta.org/tv/videos/animal-experimentation/803731940001.aspx (last 
visited June 11, 2011) (video of brain damage experiments by government funded re­
searchers at the University of Pennsylvania). 
140. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101­
624, § 2503, 104 Stat. 3359, 4066 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 2158 (2006)). 
141. Id. 
142. Under Michigan law, for example,
 
Dogs and cats shall not be offered for sale or sold to a research facility at
 
public auction or by weight; or purchased by a research facility at public auc­
tion or by weight.  A research facility shall not purchase any dogs or cats ex­
cept from a licensed dealer, public dog pound, humane society, or from a
 
person who breeds or raises dogs or cats for sale.  Any county, city, village or
 
township operating a dog pound or animal shelter may sell for an amount not
 
to exceed $10.00 per animal or otherwise dispose of unclaimed or unwanted
 
dogs and cats to a Michigan research facility. 
MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 287.389 (West 2010) (emphasis added); see also Youngblood 
v. Jackson Cnty., 184 N.W.2d 290, 291 (Mich. Ct. App. (1970) (holding that “[i]f Jackson 
County has authority to operate a dog pound . . . [it is] authori[zed to sell] . . . im­
pounded and unlicensed dogs to the University of Michigan”).  Under Massachusetts 
law, however, “no person, institution, animal dealer or their authorized agents shall 
transport, or cause to be transported, any animal obtained from any municipal or public 
pound, public agency, or dog officer acting individually or in an official capacity into the 
commonwealth for purposes of research, experimentation, testing, instruction or dem­
onstration.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 174D (2008).  In 2009, the USDA reported 
that there were 20,160 cats and 67,337 dogs used in laboratory research. PAIN  TYPE: 
TOTAL 2009, supra note 2, at 2.  Of those, 180 cats and 782 dogs were used in painful R 
procedures, but their pain was not alleviated because pain relieving drugs would have 
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The USDA is responsible for enforcing the AWA and promul­
gating regulations.143  The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Ser­
vice (APHIS), an agency within the USDA, is responsible for 
administration through its Animal Care (AC) program.144  Under 
the AWA, the Secretary of Agriculture has a duty to “promulgate 
standards to govern the humane handling, care, treatment, and 
transportation of animals by . . . research facilities,”145 including 
minimum standards “for handling, housing, feeding, watering, sani­
tation, ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather and tempera­
tures, adequate veterinary care, and separation by species,”146 “and 
for a physical environment adequate to promote the psychological 
well-being of primates.”147  These standards of humane care and 
treatment are contained in Title 9 of the Code of Federal Regula­
tions.148  The Secretary, however, does not have authority “to pro­
mulgate rules, regulations, or orders with regard to the design, 
outlines, or guidelines of actual research or experimentation by a 
research facility as determined by such research facility.”149 
To ensure compliance, the AWA requires that private research 
facilities be licensed by150 or registered with the Secretary of 
Agriculture.151  Each non-federal research facility that uses 
animals must be inspected once a year.152  APHIS has approxi­
interfered with or compromised the research. PAIN TYPE: WITH PAIN, NO DRUGS 2009,
 
supra note 2, at 2. R
 
143. APHIS ANIMAL  CARE, THE  ANIMAL  CARE  PROGRAM AND THE U.S. DE­
PARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE’S AUTHORITY UNDER THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT: BA­
SIC  QUESTIONS AND  ANSWERS (2005), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_ 
welfare/content/printable_version/faq_awa.pdf. 
144. Id. 
145. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(1) (2006). 
146. Id. § 2143(a)(2). 
147. Id. § 2143(a)(2)(B). 
148. 9 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 -3.142 (2010). 
149. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(6)(A)(i). 
150. Id. § 2133. 
151. Id. § 2136. 
152. Id. § 2146(a); ANIMAL  CARE  ANNUAL  REPORT OF  ACTIVITIES: FISCAL 
YEAR 2007, at 11 (2008) [hereinafter ANIMAL CARE ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES], 
available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_welfare/content/printable_ 
version/2007_AC_Report.pdf.  Federal facilities are not required to register with 
APHIS and they are not inspected to ensure compliance; however, they must comply 
with the AWA’s regulations. Id.  Federal research facilities must establish a Federal 
[Institutional Animal Care and Use] Committee that has the same composition and 
responsibilities required of nonfederal research facilities.  7 U.S.C. § 2143(c); see also  9 
C.F.R. § 2.37.  Instead of reporting deficiencies to APHIS, the Federal Committee re­
ports to the head of the federal agency conducting the research.  7 U.S.C. § 2143(c); see 
also 9 C.F.R. § 2.37.  The head of the federal agency is “responsible for (1) all corrective 
action to be taken at the facility; and (2) the granting of all exceptions to inspection 
 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE305.txt unknown Seq: 24 29-SEP-11 13:43 
878 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:855 
mately 100 AC inspectors who document compliance of stand­
ards.153 
According to the USDA, approximately 20,000 violations of 
the AWA occurred every year between October 1, 2003 and Sep­
tember 30, 2006, affecting over two million animals.154  Reports 
from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006 documented 20,281 
violations affecting 453,194 animals.155  A similar report from 2004 
to 2005 documented 20,845 violations affecting 1,364,358 animals.156 
From 2003 to 2004, there were 18,275 violations affecting 382,823 
animals.157  Over this three-year period, the number of reported 
AWA violations per year remained fairly constant, thus suggesting 
that the current system of sanction is an ineffective deterrent. 
3. Legislation Protecting Great Apes 
An August 2005 poll revealed that “[n]early twice as many 
Americans support a ban on chimpanzee research as do those who 
oppose such a ban.”158  The retirement of “chimpanzees used in re­
search for more than 10 years” is supported by 71 percent of Amer­
icans.159  The United States, however, has not been at the forefront 
of the international movement to protect primates; whereas, there 
are bans or limits on chimpanzee research in many other coun­
protocol.”  7 U.S.C. § 2143(c); see also 9 C.F.R. § 2.37.  All registered and federal re­
search facilities must also submit a report of their activities involving the number of 
animals used, their species, and the number of procedures that were or were not pain­
ful, and whether pain-relieving drugs were administered during painful procedures. 
ANIMAL CARE ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES, supra, at 12. 
153. ANIMAL CARE ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 152, at 8. R 
154. USDA, VIOLATION SUMMARY OCT. 1, 2005 TO SEPT. 30, 2006, at 22 (2007) 
[hereinafter VIOLATIONS 05-06], available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/ 
downloads/violations/2006violations.pdf; USDA, VIOLATION  SUMMARY  OCT. 1, 2004 
TO SEPT. 30, 2005, at 24 (2005) [hereinafter VIOLATIONS 04-05], available at http://www. 
aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/downloads/violations/2005violations.pdf; USDA, VIO­
LATION  SUMMARY OCT. 1, 2003 TO  SEPT. 30, 2004, at 22 (2005) [hereinafter VIOLA­
TIONS 03-04], available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/downloads/ 
violations/2004violations.pdf.  These summaries include all violations of the AWA, not 
only the violations within the laboratory context. 
155. VIOLATIONS 05-06, supra note 154, at 22. R 
156. VIOLATIONS 04-05, supra note 154, at 24. R 
157. VIOLATIONS 05-06, supra note 154, at 22. R 
158. New England Anti-Vivisection Society, Public Opinion, PROJECT R&R: RE­
LEASE & RESTITUTION FOR  CHIMPANZEES IN U.S. LABORATORIES, http://www. 
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tries.160  The United Kingdom, for example, banned licenses for 
chimpanzee research in 1997.161  In 2000, New Zealand was the first 
nation to ban chimpanzee research.162  The Netherlands followed in 
2002, Sweden in 2003, Austria in 2006, and Belgium in 2008.163 
Australia issued a policy statement limiting chimpanzee research in 
2003.164  Japan put a strong moratorium on chimpanzee research in 
2006.165 
In the United States, Congress first passed legislation specifi­
cally regarding primate research in 2000.166  The Chimpanzee 
Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act (CHIMP 
Act) provides a national sanctuary system “for the lifetime care of 
[surplus] chimpanzees that have been used, or were bred or pur­
chased for use, in research conducted or supported by . . . agen­
cies of the Federal Government.”167  When the CHIMP Act 
was first enacted, however, there was a provision that allowed for 
the temporary removal of retired chimpanzees from the sanctu­
ary for medical research.168  The CHIMP Act was amended in 
160. New England Anti-Vivisection Society, International Bans, PROJECT R&R: 
RELEASE & RESTITUTION FOR  CHIMPANZEES IN U.S. LABORATORIES, http://www. 







166. Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-551, 114 Stat. 2752 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 287a-3a(a) 
(2006)). 
167. Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 287a-3a(a). 
168. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A)(ii)(I) - (IV). 
The chimpanzee may be used in research if – (I) the Secretary finds that there 
are special circumstances in which there is need for that individual, specific 
chimpanzee (based on that chimpanzee’s prior medical history, prior research 
protocols, and current status), and there is no chimpanzee with a similar his­
tory and current status that is reasonably available among chimpanzees that 
are not in the sanctuary system; (II) the Secretary finds that there are techno­
logical or medical advancements that were not available at the time the chim­
panzee entered the sanctuary system, and that such advancements can and will 
be used in the research; (III) the Secretary finds that the research is essential 
to address an important public health need; (IV) and the design of the re­
search involves minimal pain and physical harm to the chimpanzee, and other­
wise minimizes mental harm, distress, and disturbance to the chimpanzee and 
the social group in which the chimpanzee lives (including with respect to re­
moval of the chimpanzee from the sanctuary facility involved). 
Id. 
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2007 and now prohibits the return of retired chimpanzees to 
research.169 
There has also been proposed legislation, namely the Great 
Ape Protection Act (GAPA),170 which aims to end all invasive re­
search171 on great apes.172  But this legislation would only begin to 
put an end to experimentation on primates.  Chimpanzees are the 
only great apes currently used in laboratory research in the United 
States.173  There are approximately 1,000 to 1,200 chimpanzees in 
nine research facilities in the United States, approximately half of 
these research facilities are owned by the United States.174  How­
ever, currently “[t]here are more than 112,000 nonhuman primates 
169. 42 U.S.C. § 287a-3a (amended 2007). 
[A] chimpanzee accepted into the sanctuary system may not be used for stud­
ies or research, except . . . [that] [t]he chimpanzee may be used for noninvasive 
behavioral studies or medical studies based on information collected during 
the course of normal veterinary care that is provided for the benefit of the 
chimpanzee, provided that any such study involves minimal physical and 
mental harm, pain, distress, and disturbance to the chimpanzee and the social 
group in which the chimpanzee lives. 
Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A). 
170. Great Ape Protection Act, S. 3694, 111th Cong. (2010); Great Ape Protec­
tion Act, H.R. 1326, 111th Cong. (2009).  The Great Ape Protection Act was originally 
introduced on April 17, 2008.  H.R. Rep. No. 5852, 110th Cong. (2008).  On March 5, 
2009, the Great Ape Protection Act was reintroduced in the House and on August 3, 
2010 in the Senate.  H.R. 1326; S. 3694. 
171. Congress defines “invasive research” as 
any research that may cause death, bodily injury, pain, distress, fear, injury, or 
trauma to a great ape, including – (i) the testing of any drug or intentional 
exposure to a substance that may be detrimental to the health or psychological 
well-being of a great ape; (ii) research that involves penetrating or cutting the 
body or removing body parts, restraining, tranquilizing, or anesthetizing a 
great ape; or (iii) isolation, social deprivation, or other experimental physical 
manipulations that may be detrimental to the health or psychological well­
being of a great ape. 
H.R. 1326.  In contrast, noninvasive research is, for example, observing primates’ social 
behavior in a sanctuary. 
172. “Great apes” include chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, orangutans, and gib­
bons. Id. 
173. Latest HSUS Undercover Investigation Reveals Abuse of Chimps, Other Pri­
mates in Federally Funded Research Laboratory, THE  HUMANE  SOC’Y OF THE U.S. 
(Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.humanesociety.org/news/press_releases/2009/03/ 
investigation_chimps_sm_030409.html [hereinafter Investigation Reveals Abuse of 
Chimps]; see also New England Anti-Vivisection Society, Research Labs with Chimpan­
zees, PROJECT R&R: RELEASE & RESTITUTION FOR CHIMPANZEES IN U.S. LABORATO­
RIES, http://www.releasechimps.org/labs/labs-with-chimpanzees (last visited June 11, 
2011). 
174. Investigation Reveals Abuse of Chimps, supra note 173; see also Research R 
Labs with Chimpanzees, supra note 173. R 
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being kept in more than 200 U.S. laboratories.”175  Therefore, prob­
lematically, the GAPA would leave over 100,000 primates confined 
in laboratories and subject to continued research.176 
C.	 Access to the Courts: Legal Thinghood, Personhood, and 
Standing 
1.	 Nonhuman Animals as Property 
The law generally recognizes two categories: property and per­
sons.177  Property is defined as “[t]he right to possess, use, and en­
joy a determinate thing.”178  A thing is “[t]he subject matter of a 
right.”179  The legal status of nonhuman animals is “legal 
thinghood.”180  There is historical181 and legal precedent182 support­
ing the property status of animals.183 
Social contract theorist John Locke argued that when humans 
improve nature through their labor they translate it into prop­
175.	 Investigation Reveals Abuse of Chimps, supra note 173. R 
176. Great Apes receive much public attention and it is likely that many people 
view legislation such as the GAPA as adequately protecting the entire primate commu­
nity.  Therefore, there needs to be more public awareness about the primate population 
that will be unaffected by this proposed legislation. 
177. This is problematic because “[a]nimals are not humans and [they] are not 
inanimate objects.”  Bartlett, supra note 99, at 148 (citation omitted). R 
178.	 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 38, at 1335 (emphasis added). R 
179.	 Id. at 1617. 
180. RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 7, at 4; see also FRANCIONE, supra note 7, R 
at 166. See generally The Legal Thinghood of Animals, supra note 7, at 472. R 
181. RATTLING THE  CAGE, supra note 7, at 10-22.  “[H]istorical precedent has R 
supported . . . [opponents of animal rights] unquestioned commitment to human domi­
nance and the exploitative use of nonhuman animals as chattel.”  Bartlett, supra note 
99, at 152. R 
182. See, e.g., State v. Mata, 668 N.W. 2d 448, 469 (Neb. 2003) (noting that “pri­
vately owned animals are ‘effects’ subject to the protections of the Fourth Amend­
ment”); Fackler v. Genetzky, 595 N.W. 2d 884, 891 (Neb. 1999) (“[T]he general rule is 
that an animal . . . is personal property.”); Campbell v. District of Columbia, 19 App. 
D.C. 131 (1901) (“The owner of an animal dying within the city limits, is entitled to a 
reasonable opportunity to exercise his unextinguished right of property in the carcass 
. . . .”). 
183. There are two basic arguments supporting the property status of animals. 
The first is that humans are morally superior.  The second argument is theological. 
FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 36; Bartlett, supra note 99, at 149.  “In the Book of Gene- R 
sis, God gives man dominion over animals. We are the sovereign authority. We decide 
if and how they live, where and when they die.” Improved Standards for Lab. Animals 
Act; and Enforcement of the Animal Welfare Act by the Animal and Plant Health Inspec­
tion Serv.: Hearing on H.R. 5725 Before the Subcomm. on Dep’t Operations, Research 
and Foreign Agric. of the H. Comm. on Agric., 98th Cong. 103 (1984) (statement of 
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erty.184  Capturing a wild animal is an example Locke used to illus­
trate his theory: 
And even amongst us the Hare that any one is Hunting, is 
thought his who purses her during the Chase. For being a Beast 
that is still looked upon as common, and no Man’s private Pos­
session; whoever has imploy’d so much labour about any of that 
kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from 
the state of Nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a 
Property.185 
Similarly, the law recognizes a property right in an animal that has 
been removed from its natural habitat.186  Under this reasoning, 
humans are entitled to ownership of animals over which they have 
dominion and control.  “Humans are entitled under the laws of 
property to convey or sell their animals, consume or kill them, use 
them as collateral, obtain their natural dividends, and exclude 
others from interfering with an owner’s exercise of dominion and 
control over them.”187 
There is a link between the property status of animals and the 
“presumed moral superiority and entitlement of humans.”188 
Humans have created a belief system that animals exist for human 
use.189  The law is rooted in this belief.190  Changing this ideology 
184. JOHN  LOCKE, TWO  TREATISES OF  GOVERNMENT 290 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge University Press 2003) (1690). 
185. Id. 
186. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (stating that wild animals that 
have been “wounded, circumvented or ensnared” are deprived of their natural liberty 
and thus subject to the control of the human who pursued them); see also Geer v. 
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Okla., 441 U.S. 322 
(1979) (“[A]ll the animals which can be taken upon the earth, in the sea, or in the air,— 
that is to say, wild animals,—belong to those who take them . . . because that which 
belong to nobody is acquired by the natural law by the person who first possesses it.”). 
Historically, the law similarly recognized that a married woman was the property of her 
husband. See infra note 231 and accompanying text. R 
187. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 24. R 
188. Taimie L. Bryant, Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood for 
Animals, the Status of Animals as Property, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans, 39 
RUTGERS L.J. 247, 328 (2008). 
189. RATTLING THE  CAGE, supra note 7, at 10.  Based on these belief systems, R 
humans consume animals in a variety of ways: for food, clothing, and entertainment, 
and in the form of the benefits of biomedical research such as pharmaceuticals. 
190. Id. The AWA regulates human use of animals. See supra note 6 and note 123 R 
and accompanying next.  One of the stated purposes of the AWA is “to ensure that 
animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition purposes or for use as pets 
are provided humane care and treatment.” Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006) 
(emphasis added).  The AWA also explicitly excludes from protection under its provi­
sions farm animals “used or intended for use as food.” Animal Welfare Act, § 2132(g). 
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will require massive economic and social restructuring because the 
food, clothing, entertainment, and biomedical research industries 
are dependent on the legal exploitation of animals.191  Taimie Bry­
ant argues that “[s]haring legal space in our laws and in our courts 
seems unlikely as long as humans consider themselves morally su­
perior to animals and reinforce that conception by treating animals 
as their property.”192  Women were also historically denied the right 
to share legal space in our laws,193 and this concept was reinforced 
by treating women as their husband’s property. 
As an illustration of the property status of primates, there were 
tax consequences when Fouts purchased an infant chimpanzee from 
a research facility.  Washoe, the chimpanzee saved from the space 
program,194 suffered grief after losing a baby.195  To ease Washoe’s 
grief, Fouts found “a baby for Washoe to adopt.”196  Fouts pur­
chased Loulis for ten thousand dollars plus 7.5 percent sales tax.197 
2. Legal Personhood 
Legal personhood is important because it “establishes one’s le­
gal right to be ‘recognized as a potential bearer of legal rights.’”198 
A common understanding of the word “person” is “human.”199  In 
contrast, “animal” is defined as “[a]ny living creature other than a 
human being.”200  But legal personhood is not about humanness.201 
As Congress understands it, “In determining the meaning of any 
191. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 253-54. R 
192. Bryant, supra note 188, at 330. R 
193. See infra Part III.A. 
194. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. R 
195. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 234. R 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 237, 343. 
198. RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 7, at 4 (quoting Michael Bogan, Article 6, R 
in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 111 (Asbjorn 
Eide, et al. eds., 1992)). 
199. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra note 12, at 924; see also BLACK’S  LAW  DIC- R 
TIONARY, supra note 38, at 1257. R 
200. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 38, at 102. R 
201. Corporations and ships, for example, are legal persons. Fisher, supra note 5, R 
at 439.  In the late 1800s, 
the Supreme Court began finding corporations to be “persons” for some pur­
poses under the Constitution, and in the 1900s, the Court began applying some 
but not all of the Bill of Rights’ protections to corporations.  Presently, corpo­
rations enjoy Fifth Amendment due process protections, along with “first 
amendment guarantees of political speech, commercial speech, and negative 
free speech rights; fourth amendment safeguards against unreasonable regula­
tory search; fifth amendment double jeopardy and liberty rights; and sixth and 
seventh amendments entitlements to trial by jury.” 
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Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the 
word[ ] ‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associa­
tions, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as 
well as individuals.”202  “Personhood is an important idea in the 
law, and . . . the manner in which a statutory scheme defines ‘per­
son’ substantially impacts the interpretation and application of that 
scheme.”203  Legal personhood is a legal construction that estab­
lishes access to the courts, and without it, one lacks legal standing. 
3. Nonhuman Primates and Legal Standing 
Legal standing is one of the biggest threshold obstacles for 
animal activists.  Francione states, “Standing is a prerequisite—per­
haps the most important prerequisite—for the enforcement of 
rights.”204  There is constitutional standing,205 which requires a 
plaintiff to show injury in fact, causation, and redressability; and 
prudential standing.206  The latter requires, in the absence of an ex­
press citizen suit provision, a plaintiff to show her injury is within 
the zone of interests that Congress arguably intended to protect 
under the relevant statute, meaning she must assert her own rights 
and not those of a third party.207  Because the legal status of ani­
mals is legal thinghood, animals have no legal standing.  Standing to 
challenge their treatment must come through humans. 
In this respect, the Animal Welfare Act (AWA)208 is ineffective 
because animal welfare advocates and organizations have difficulty 
litigating under the statute because they often lack standing.209  The 
Fourth Circuit stated, “The statutory design [of the AWA] is . . . 
Cupp, supra note 88, at 52-53 (quoting Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: R 
Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990)); see also Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Inanimate objects are 
sometimes parties in litigation.”); Tucker v. Alexanderoff, 183 U.S. 424, 438 (1902) (“A 
ship is born when she is launched . . . .  She acquires a personality of her own . . . .”); 
Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (finding corporations are per­
sons under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
202. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
203. Michael J. Gerardi, Note, The “Person” at Federal Law: A Framework and a 
Rico Test Suite, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2239, 2267 (2009). 
204. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 67. R 
205. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
206. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation Church and State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). 
207. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
208. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006). 
209. See, e.g., Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 
799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986). 
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inconsistent with [a] private right of action . . . . The Act . . . does 
not imply any provision for lawsuits by private individuals as a com­
plement to the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture.”210  Thus, 
an animal lacks the capacity to sue, and therefore cannot assert that 
there has been a violation of her rights, nor can anyone sue on her 
behalf.211  As Congressman Rose aptly stated while introducing a 
bill to amend the AWA to include a citizen suit provision, “if the 
animals can’t sue on their own behalf, and if people can’t sue on 
their behalf, who can?”212 
Cases brought under the Endangered Species Act (ESA)213 do 
not always face the same difficulty as the AWA because there is a 
citizen suit provision, which allows a private individual standing to 
sue.214  The ESA, however, does not provide a remedy for chimpan­
zees bred in captivity and used in laboratory research because they 
are classified as a “threatened species,” rather than an “endangered 
species.”215 
Although the Ninth Circuit dismissed a case brought under en­
vironmental laws for lack of standing, the court suggested its will­
ingness to accept species standing if Congress modified the 
language of the statutes: 
[W]e see no reason why Article III prevents Congress from au­
thorizing a suit in the name of an animal, any more than it pre­
vents suits brought in the name of artificial persons such as 
corporations, partnerships or trusts, and even ships, or of juridi-
The [Animal Welfare] Act seeks to insure that “animals intended for use in
 
research facilities . . . are provided humane care and treatment.” . . . There is
 
no indication, however, that Congress intended this goal to come at the ex­
pense of progress in medical research.  To the contrary, both the language of
 
the statute and the means chosen by Congress to enforce it preserve the hope
 
that responsible primate research hold for the treatment and cure of human­
kind’s most terrible afflictions.  The statutory design is, in turn, inconsistent
 
with the private right of action that plaintiff’s assert.
 
Id. at 939 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2131(1)); see also Rob Roy Smith, Note, Standing on 
Their Own Four Legs: The Future of Animal Welfare Litigation After Animal Legal 
Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 29 ENVTL. L. 989, 992 (1999). 
210. Int’l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 939-40. 
211. Deawn A. Hersini, Comment, Can’t Get There From Here . . . Without Sub­
stantive Revision: The Case for Amending the Animal Welfare Act, 70 UMKC L. REV. 
145, 150 (2001). 
212. 135 CONG. REC. H1932 (May 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. Rose). 
213. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). 
214. Id. § 1540(g). 
215. 16 U.S.C. § 1533; 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2010); Investigation Reveals Abuse of 
Chimps, supra note 173; Chimpanzee Facts, supra note 44. R 
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cally incompetent persons such as infants, juveniles and mental 
incompetents.216 
This case illustrates a willingness of the judiciary to extend standing 
to animals, but deference to the legislature to act. 
In 2005, a groundbreaking case in Brazil granted a chimpanzee 
access to the court.217  A writ of habeas corpus was filed on behalf 
of Suı́ça, a chimpanzee who lived in the city zoo in Salvador, 
Bahia.218 
[T]he petitioner, member of the chimpanzee species, is impris­
oned at Salvador Zoo in a[n] unsuitable enclosure (total area of 
77.56 m2, height 4.0 m, and confined area of 2.75 m), being hin­
dered of her right of movement . . . . The lack of space, the bare 
cement floor, and the solitary confinement was causing great suf­
fering to Suı́ça.219 
The relief sought was Suı́ça’s release from solitary confinement and 
transfer to a primate sanctuary.220  Unfortunately, Suı́ça died and 
the motion was dismissed.221  This case is significant, however, be­
cause this was the first time a court recognized a nonhuman primate 
as a plaintiff.222  Acknowledging that Suı́ça’s case involved a com­
plex and controversial issue, Judge Edmundo Lucio da Cruz stated 
in his opinion, 
I am sure that with the acceptance of the debate, I caught the 
attention of jurists from all over the country, bringing the matter 
to discussion.  Criminal Procedural Law is not static, rather sub­
ject to constant changes, and new decisions have to adapt to new 
times.  I believe that even with “Suı́ça’s” death the matter will 
216. Cetcean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
plaintiff, as representative for all whales, porpoises, and dolphins, lacked standing 
under environmental laws to challenge the Navy’s use of sonar). 
217. See Tribunal do Juri de Salvador [Jury Court of Salvador], No.833085-3/2005,´
In re Suı́ça, Correio da Bahia, 19.9.2005 (Brazil), English translation available at http:// 
www.animallaw.info/nonus/cases/cabrsuicaeng2005.htm, Portuguese decision available 
at http://www.animallaw.info/nonus/cases/cabrsuicapt2005.htm; Clayton, supra note 36. R 
218. In re Suı́ça, No. 833085-3/2005; Clayton, supra note 36. R 
219. Clayton, supra note 36. R 
220. In re Suı́ça, No. 833085-3/2005; Clayton, supra note 36. R 
221. In re Suı́ça, No. 833085-3/2005; Clayton, supra note 36. R 
222. In re Suı́ça, No. 833085-3/2005; Clayton, supra note 36; Heron Jose De R 
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continue to be discussed . . . .  The topic will not die with this writ, 
it will certainly continue to remain controversial.223 
As Suı́ça’s case demonstrates, the law is dynamic and adapta­
ble and should change to reflect public attitudes about animals. 
III. EVOLVING ATTITUDES, EVOLVING LAWS: ILLUMINATING
 
LEGISLATIVE CONTRADICTIONS & INADEQUACIES
 
Movements for social justice disrupt what is socially and legally 
permissible.  Historically, extending legal rights to a new entity or 
group of individuals has been unthinkable for some members of so­
ciety and, thus, is met with resistance.224  This is not surprising 
because 
each time there is a movement to confer rights onto some new 
“entity,” the proposal is bound to sound odd or frightening or 
laughable.  This is partly because until the rightless thing receives 
its rights, we cannot see it as anything but a thing for the use of 
“us”—those who are holding rights at the time.225 
The social movement to confer rights on women, for example, 
seemed odd or laughable to some people in the late 1800s to the 
mid-1900s. 
A comparison of the social movement to confer legal protec­
tions and rights on animals and the women’s rights movement 
reveals that there was a mindset about the property status of wo­
men that is strikingly similar to the current mindset of the property 
status of animals.  This mindset evolved over time so that women 
were no longer perceived as property, which caused a shift in law. 
Similarly, there is a shift occurring in the mindset of the general 
public that some animals are more than things.  In addition, more of 
the human population perceives primates, in particular great apes, 
as intelligent, emotional, social beings.  Finally, there is an evolving 
attitude regarding animals’ experience of pain. These shifts in pub­
lic perception and attitude require a reexamination of the AWA and 
its accompanying regulations. 
Contradiction is a theme in animal protective legislation, which 
partly explains why such legislation is inadequate. These contradic­
223. In re Suı́ça, No. 833085-3/2005 (emphasis added); see also Clayton, supra 
note 36; Gordilho, supra note 222, at 82; The Entitlement of Chimpanzees, supra note 8, R 
at 279. 
224. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? 3 (1996). 
225. Id. at 5. 
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tions originate, in part, from humans’ speciesest belief system.226 
The AWA, for example, contains provisions that allow painful and 
distressing procedures, which contradicts the stated purpose of “hu­
mane care and treatment” of animals.227  These exceptions arise in 
situations when such procedures are deemed “scientifically neces­
sary” or “scientifically justified.”228  In other words, when there is 
some human benefit at stake.  In this framework, animal welfare is 
secondary to human interests.  As a result, as Professor Francione 
aptly recognizes, when the AWA was enacted and subsequently 
amended, “Congress simultaneously created a rule and an excep­
tion that was broad enough to swallow the rule.”229  In practice, the 
AWA fails to adequately protect the physical integrity of animals 
and the psychological well-being of primates because there are ex­
ceptions built into the law that undermine their protection and hu­
mane treatment. 
A.	 The Social Movement to Confer Legal Protections and Rights 
on Animals is Met with Resistance Similar to that 
Encountered by the Women’s Rights Movement 
Historically, women were legally powerless in American soci­
ety.  In 1908, the Supreme Court stated, “history discloses the fact 
that woman has always been dependent upon man.”230  Similar to 
animals, women were considered property; they were owned and 
controlled by their fathers and husbands.231  Women were identi­
fied by gender, whereas men were identified by humanness. 
Granting women access to academic institutions, for example, 
was strongly resisted.  The ideology behind this gender inequality 
was based on an understanding that education had a detrimental 
physical effect on a woman’s reproductive ability; thus, some of so­
ciety believed that women’s access to education threatened the per­
petuation of the human race.232  In Muller v. Oregon, the Court 
stated, “healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the 
226.	 See supra note 12 (definition of speciesism). R 
227.	 See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006). 
228.	 Id. § 2143(a)(3)(C)(v). 
229.	 FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 205. R 
230.	 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). 
231. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 41 (1980) (“[A] woman was 
regarded as a chattel and denied a separate legal identity.”); Baby v. State, 916 A.2d 
410, 422 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007), vacated, 946 A.2d 436 (Md. 2008) (discussing “the 
historical notion that, because women were, in legal contemplation, chattel, loss of chas­
tity was considered to be a devaluation of a man’s property”). 
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physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest 
and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.”233 
Once women claimed the right to enter academic institutions from 
which they were previously excluded, there were massive social and 
economic consequences.  The private and public spheres were rede­
fined, as was the family.  Although reproduction did decrease as 
women educated themselves and entered the labor market in new 
ways, the fate of the human race was not doomed by the social and 
economic consequences that flowed from changing gender roles. 
In the late 1800s, women met legal resistance to their changing 
status in society.  Myra Bradwell, for example, was denied admit­
tance to practice law by the state of Vermont because she was a 
married woman.234  Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion is an illus­
tration of the dominant societal attitude toward women’s move­
ment out of the private sphere and into the public sphere: 
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The nat­
ural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female 
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. 
The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in 
the divine ordinance, as well in the nature of things, indicates the 
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain 
and functions of womanhood.  The harmony, not to say identity, 
of interest and views which belong, or should belong, to the fam­
ily institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a 
distinct and independent career from that of her husband.235 
Charlotte Perkins Stetson Gilman, first-wave feminist and au­
thor, argued that the women’s movement of the nineteenth century 
first had to declare “that women are persons!”236  This is not to 
suggest that animals should be granted access to academic institu­
tions, admitted to the practice of law, or declared persons, but to 
highlight a changing understanding of women’s property status and 
233. Id. at 421. 
234. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 131 (1872). The Supreme Court affirmed 
the lower court decision and found that such refusal was within the state’s power and 
did not violate the Constitution because the right to practice law was not a privilege or 
immunity of a citizen of the United States. Id. at 138-39; see also Ex parte Lockwood, 
154 U.S. 116, 116-18 (1894) (denying a petition for a mandamus requiring the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia to admit petitioner, a woman, to practice law); In re 
Goodell, 1875 WL 3615, at *8 (Wis. Aug. 1875) (“We cannot but think the common law 
wise in excluding women from the profession of the law.”). 
235. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141. 
236. CHARLOTTE PERKINS STETSON, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS: A STUDY OF THE 
ECONOMIC  RELATION  BETWEEN  MEN AND  WOMEN AS A  FACTOR IN  SOCIAL  EVOLU­
TION 49 (Carl N. Degler ed., 1966). 
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how the past social and legal status women occupied seems outra­
geous today. 
The women’s rights movement initially “sound[ed] odd or 
frightening or laughable”237 to some because it challenged what was 
socially and legally permissible.  First- and second-wave feminists 
were met with strong resistance, which was grounded in years of 
ideology that supported a gender imbalance, the disruption of 
which had vast social and economic consequences.  Despite this, the 
women’s rights movement changed social and legal norms. Women 
obtained access to education and the labor market; they gained re­
productive control; they attained the right to own property, con­
tract, divorce, vote, and to defend their right to bodily integrity. 
Women’s status as property changed when society began thinking 
about women differently, when society began treating women dif­
ferently.  Changes in the law followed, because “the law evolves 
from the way society thinks and behaves.”238 
B.	 Allowing Unfettered Research to Advance Human Interests at 
the Expense of Animal Welfare Undermines the AWA’s 
Protective Purpose 
The attempt to balance human and nonhuman animal interests 
creates a contradiction that is at the root of the AWA.  This balanc­
ing act was clearly expressed from the passage of the AWA’s prede­
cessor, the LAWA, as is evident from a House Conference Report, 
which states that efforts had been made to create 
an effective bill which will codify the noblest and most compas­
sionate concern that the human heart holds for those small ani­
mals whose very existence is dedicated to the advancement of 
medical skill and knowledge while at the same time still preserv­
ing for the medical and research professions an unfettered oppor­
tunity to carry forward their vital work in behalf of all 
mankind.239 
Compassion for animals was expressed in the same breath that 
characterized them as existing for the purpose of advancing medical 
science.  Furthermore, the same legislation that limited or restricted 
research facilities to ensure humane handling, care, and treatment 
237.	 STONE, supra note 224, at 5. R 
238.	 Clayton, supra note 36. R 
239. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1848, at 6 (1966) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://www. 
nal.usda.gov/awic/pubs/AWA2007/confrep_aug1966.pdf; see also Medlock v. Bd. of Trs. 
of Univ. of Mass., 580 N.E.2d 387, 388 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (“The Act balances soci­
ety’s commitment to the humane treatment of animals with its need for research.”). 
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of animals also allowed unfettered research that was considered to 
be vital to humankind.240  This echoes the argument that women’s 
access to education threatened the perpetuation of the human 
race.241 
In 1970, a House committee report balanced interests similar 
to those balanced by the passage of LAWA.242  The purpose of the 
proposed bill was stated, in part, to 
establish[ ] by law the humane ethic that animals should be ac­
corded the basic creature comforts of adequate housing, ample 
food and water, reasonable handling, decent sanitation, sufficient 
ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather and temperature, 
and adequate veterinary care including the appropriate use of 
pain-killing drugs. At the same time this ethic is embraced, the 
bill recognizes the responsibility and specifically preserves the 
necessary domain of the medical community. The bill in no man­
ner authorizes the disruption or interference with scientific re­
search or experimentation. Under this bill the research scientist 
still holds the key to the laboratory door. This committee and the 
Congress, however, expect that the work that’s done behind that 
laboratory door will be done with compassion and with care.243 
Again, compassion is tempered by a reservation allowing for great 
deference to research facilities.  The AWA authorizes the humane 
use of animals, which creates a tension between using animals and 
ensuring their welfare.  This tension will almost always give on the 
side of human use and at the expense of animals’ welfare. Viola­
tions of the AWA are evidence that what is done behind the labora­
tory door is not always done with compassion and care.244 
Furthermore, intentionally conducting painful procedures and with­
holding pain-killing drugs is not compassionate care. 
240. The LAWA required that the United States Department of Agriculture 
establish and promulgate standards to govern the humane handling, care, 
treatment, and transportation of animals by dealers and research facilities . . . . 
The foregoing shall not be construed as authorizing the Secretary to prescribe 
standards for the handling, care, or treatment of animals during actual re­
search or experimentation by a research facility as determined by such re­
search facility. 
Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966) (current ver­
sion at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006)) (emphasis added); see also FRANCIONE, supra 
note 7, at 192. R 
241. See supra notes 232-233 and accompanying text. R 
242. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1651 (1970), available at http://www.animallaw.info/ 
administrative/adushrep91_1651_1970.htm. 
243. Id. (emphasis added). 
244. See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text. R 
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In International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Be­
havioral Research, Inc., the Fourth Circuit, discussing the plaintiff’s 
lack of standing under the AWA, stated, 
The [Animal Welfare] Act seeks to insure that “animals intended 
for use in research facilities . . . are provided humane care and 
treatment.” . . .  There is no indication, however, that Congress 
intended this goal to come at the expense of progress in medical 
research.  To the contrary, both the language of the statute and 
the means chosen by Congress to enforce it preserve the hope 
that responsible primate research holds for the treatment and 
cure of humankind’s most terrible afflictions.245 
Preserving this hope, in this case, came tragically at the expense of 
the primates involved.246  Taub, the defendant, “was studying the 
capacity of monkeys to learn to use a limb after nerves had been 
severed.”247  Pacheco, the complainant, observed the horrific exper­
iments that the Silver Spring Monkeys were subjected to and the 
conditions in which they were confined.248  Describing the “acute 
noxious stimuli test,” Pacheco stated, 
I was to take a monkey . . . and strap him into a homemade im­
mobilizing chair, where he would be held at the waist, ankles, 
wrists and neck.  The acute noxious stimuli were to be applied 
with a pair of haemostats (surgical pliers) clamped and fastened 
on to the animal, and locked to the tightest notch.  I was to ob­
serve which parts of the monkey’s body felt pain. . . .249 
Pacheco, recalling a conversation he had with one of Taub’s stu­
dents about the “acute noxious stimuli test,” stated that one of the 
monkeys 
had been in such bad shape that he had begun to mutilate his 
own chest cavity, and she then confided that putting him in a 
245. Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 
934, 939 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Salk v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. A120289, 2008 
WL 5274536, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Congress intended that the federal AWA 
ensure that those animals used in research facilities are humanely treated.  However, 
Congress did not intend this goal to be achieved at the expense of progress in medical 
research.  The AWA was intended both to protect animal welfare and to subordinate 
animal welfare to the continued independence of research scientists.  In this scheme, 
‘the research scientist still holds the key to the laboratory door.’ Thus, Congress bal­
anced competing goals when enacting the AWA.” (internal citation omitted) (quoting 
H.R. REP. 91-1654 (1970)) (citing Int’l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d 934)). 
246. See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text. R 
247. Int’l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 936. 
248. See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text. R 




\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE305.txt unknown Seq: 39 29-SEP-11 13:43 
2011] CULTIVATING COMPASSIONATE LAW 
restraining device, and administering the noxious stimuli test, 
with his chest ripped open, and having to experience the stench 
of his rotting body, was the most disgusting thing she had ever 
done.  After the acute pain test, she said, he was destroyed.250 
This was not responsible primate research.  This was not research 
done with compassion and care.  And the only “humane care and 
treatment”251 this particular primate received was euthanasia after 
the research was concluded. 
In the context of animal welfare, language such as “responsible 
research” and “humane treatment” is ironic. The competing goals 
of animal welfare and independence of research scientists cannot 
both be satisfied. 
C.	 Inadequate Environmental Enhancements to Promote the 
Psychological Well-being of Primates 
The AWA gives research facilities wide latitude in implement­
ing the requirement of environmental enhancements adequate to 
promote the psychological well-being of primates.252  This latitude 
means that those conducting the research are responsible for deter­
mining what is adequate in order to meet minimum requirements. 
“Some facilities claim their environment enhancement programs 
are adequate because there are no distressing behaviors or appear­
ances of ill health with their primates.”253  But, “waiting to improve 
a minimally enriched environment” to minimize or manage psycho­
logical distress as it presents is contrary to the purpose of promot­
ing psychological well-being and “was not the intent of the Animal 
Welfare Act.”254 
In addition to this latitude, there are two exemptions to the 
environmental enhancement requirement.  First, a primate may be 
exempted “from participation in the environment enhancement 
plan because of its health or condition, or in consideration of its 
well-being.”255  Second, a primate may be exempted “from partici­
pation in some or all of the otherwise required environment en­
hancement plans for scientific reasons set forth in the research 
250.	 Id. at 139. 
251.	 See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006). 
252.	 See id.; 9 C.F.R. § 3.81 (2010). 
253. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPEC­
TION  SERVICE, FINAL  REPORT ON  ENVIRONMENT  ENHANCEMENT TO  PROMOTE THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL  WELL-BEING OF  NONHUMAN  PRIMATES (1999), http://www.nal.usda. 
gov/awic/enrichment/Enviromental_Enhancement_NonHuman_Primates.htm#intent. 
254.	 Id. 
255.	 9 C.F.R § 3.81(e)(1) (emphasis added). 
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proposal.”256  The first exemption involves the interests of the pri­
mate.  The second exemption involves the interests of humans. The 
second exemption undermines the protection and humane treat­
ment of primates and demonstrates that human interests can still be 
advanced at the expense of animal welfare. 
As Amy Kerwin, a former primate researcher, illustrates, in 
practice the AWA’s requirement of environmental enhancement 
sometimes fails to adequately promote the psychological well-being 
of primates: 
When I began working at the laboratory . . . the monkeys had 
wood in their cages.  The wood was removed, however, because 
the shreds of wood (from being over-manipulated) were clogging 
the drains . . . .  I tried to ask if the research facility could start 
providing wood again since the monkeys used it so much.  I men­
tioned that a branch was one of the few things the monkeys do 
not get tired of . . . .  The majority of the researchers voted to not 
supply the wood, however, because it was too inconvenient and 
time-consuming.  A more convenient form of enrichment was to 
provide the monkeys with durable plastic toys . . . .  Despite the 
toy . . . enrichment, abnormal behavior was still present in many 
of the monkeys.  The behaviors included pacing, back-flipping, 
rocking, self-biting, and fur-plucking.257 
The abnormal behavior that these rhesus monkeys exhibited shows 
that the enrichment provided is inadequate. The AWA’s environ­
mental enhancement requirements should not be compromised for 
the sake of laboratory staff convenience. 
The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), in a nine-
month (December 2007-September 2008) undercover investigation 
of the federally-funded New Iberia Research Center of the Univer­
sity of Louisiana at Lafayette, “reveal[ed] routine and unlawful mis­
treatment of hundreds of chimpanzees and other primates.”258  The 
HSUS has submitted a 108-page complaint to the USDA, which al­
leges at least 338 violations of the AWA.259  Videotape evidence260 
from the investigation 
256. Id. § 3.81(e)(2) (emphasis added). 
257. AMY  KERWIN, IMPROVING  ANIMAL  WELFARE AND  DATA  ACCURACY IN 
PRIMATE  RESEARCH  LABORATORIES: DISCUSSION AND  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 
USDA, THE IACUCS, AND THE  RESEARCH  FUNDING INSTITUTIONS 20 (2005) (report 
submitted to the USDA, Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees, and research 
funding agencies for the purpose of refining procedures and improving animal welfare 
in primate research institutions) (on file with author). 
258. Investigation Reveals Abuse of Chimps, supra note 173. R 
259. Id. 
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shows severe distress of primates in isolation: They engage in 
self-mutilation by tearing gaping wounds into their arms and legs, 
a behavior that could be the result of New Iberia Research 
Center’s failure to provide adequate environmental enhance­
ment.  Routine procedures, such as the use of powerful and pain­
ful dart guns and frightening squeeze cages for sedation, are 
shown causing acute psychological distress to chimpanzees and 
monkeys.  Infant monkeys scream as they are forcibly removed 
from their mothers so that tubes can be forced down their 
throats.  Altogether, the investigation reveals animals forced to 
endure anxiety and misery behind the razor wire of the research 
facility.261 
The AWA recognizes that primates need psychological en­
hancements.  This belief illuminates our understanding of primates 
as more than mere objects or things, but rather as intelligent, emo­
tional, social beings.  Despite this recognition, this provision of the 
AWA, in practice, fails to adequately protect those needs. 
D.	 Humans’ Interpretation of How Animals Experience Pain 
Allows for an Enormous Amount of Suffering Under the 
AWA 
Seventeenth century French philosopher René Descartes de­
scribed animals as machines like clocks, lacking reason and incapa­
ble of experiencing pain.262  Descartes’ philosophy was a mindset 
that accompanied the growth of vivisection263 in Europe during the 
seventeenth century.264  In addition, that philosophy illustrates the 
roots of current human understanding of animal pain within the 
context of vivisection.  Although human understanding of animals 
260. Id.; see Primate Investigation, Undercover Investigation at Research Lab, 
supra note 35 (video of “undercover investigation by the Humane Society of the United R 
States[, which] reveals psychological suffering of primates in research laboratories”). 
261.	 Investigation Reveals Abuse of Chimps, supra note 173. R 
262. PETER  SINGER, ANIMAL  LIBERATION 200 (1975) (citing RENÉ  DESCARTES, 
DISCOURSE ON METHOD, Vol. V). 
263. Vivisection is the practice of experimenting on living animals. MERRIAM­
WEBSTER’S, supra note 12, at 1400. R 
264. SINGER, supra note 262, at 201. R 
They administered beatings to dogs with perfect indifference, and made fun of 
those who pitied the creatures as if they felt pain. They said the animals were 
clocks; that the cries they emitted when struck were only the noise of a little 
spring that had been touched, but that the whole body was without feeling. 
They nailed poor animals up on boards by their four paws to vivisect them and 
see the circulation of the blood . . . . 
Id. at 201-02 (quoting an eyewitness account of vivisection in the late seventeenth cen­
tury that illustrates Descartes’s theory in practice). 
 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE305.txt unknown Seq: 42 29-SEP-11 13:43 
896 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:855 
and their experience of pain has evolved since Descartes’ time, 
remnants of the roots of his philosophy are evident in the language 
of protective legislation today, which recognizes, and then mini­
mizes, or navigates around, animals’ experience of pain. 
This minimization is tied to the scientific justification that re­
search on primates, for example, is valuable and necessary because 
they are similar to humans, but dissimilar enough that their physical 
and emotional integrity can be navigated around.265  According to 
Kerwin, “It was often argued in the laboratory that rhesus monkeys 
were valuable research subjects because they were closely related 
to humans.  When it came to the animal’s welfare, however, state­
ments were made by [laboratory staff] that the monkeys ‘have a 
high pain tolerance’ and a ‘different pain system.’”266  As a result of 
this disconnected and contradictory position, “chimpanzees [and 
other primates] are treated as if they are unfeeling machines.”267 
The AWA inadequately protects animals because it explicitly 
makes exceptions regarding the humane treatment of animals used 
in research facilities that are contradictory to the purported pur­
pose of protecting animals.  The Secretary of Agriculture must pro­
mulgate standards “for animal care, treatment, and practices in 
experimental procedures to assure that animal pain and distress are 
minimized.”268  This provision acknowledges that experimental pro­
cedures sometimes result in pain and distress.  It does not, however, 
prohibit such painful and distressing procedures; instead, it requires 
practices that minimize such pain and distress.  Furthermore, “in 
any practice which could cause pain to animals . . . the withholding 
of tranquilizers, anesthesia, analgesia, or euthanasia when scientifi­
cally necessary shall continue for only the necessary period of 
time.”269  Again, this provision acknowledges that some procedures 
cause animals pain.  And again, it does not prohibit such painful 
procedures; instead, it allows the withholding of pain-relieving 
drugs when scientifically necessary.  Thus, an animal may be sub­
jected to a painful and distressing experiment for as long as it takes 
to achieve a scientific objective, which is defined as some benefit to 
265. Fouts & Fouts, supra note 63, at 39. R 
266. KERWIN, supra note 257, at 25. R 
267. Fouts & Fouts, supra note 63, at 39. R 
268. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). 
269. Id. § 2143(a)(3)(C), (C)(v) (emphasis added); see PAIN TYPE: TOTAL 2009, 
supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (USDA 2009 report of number of animals used R 
in painful procedures whose pain was not alleviated because pain-relieving drugs would 
have interfered with or compromised the research). 
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the human population.  The allowance of withholding relief from 
pain contradicts the goal of humane treatment. 
Because Congress did not define “pain,”270 APHIS, the agency 
responsible for administration of the AWA, through its Animal 
Care program, developed a policy regarding painful procedures.271 
Regulations have also been promulgated regarding painful proce­
dures.272  These kinds of policies and regulations indicate a recogni­
tion that (1) animals suffer as a result of laboratory research; and 
(2) guidelines to attempt to eliminate this suffering are necessary. 
Policy 11 of the Animal Care Policy Manual defines painful 
procedures “as any procedure that would reasonably be expected to 
cause more than slight or momentary pain and/or distress in a 
human being to which that procedure is applied.”273  This policy 
requires that “[a]nimals exhibiting signs of pain, discomfort, or dis­
tress . . . receive appropriate relief unless written scientific justifica­
tion is provided in the animal activity proposal and approved by the 
[Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee] IACUC.”274 
Under Policy 11, animals are relieved of pain, discomfort, or dis­
tress unless there is scientific justification for their pain, discomfort, 
or distress.275 
The Secretary must promulgate rules and regulations that al­
low AC 
inspectors to confiscate or destroy in a humane manner any 
animal found to be suffering as a result of a failure to comply 
with any provision of [the AWA] or any regulation or standard 
issued thereunder if . . . such animal is held by a research facility 
270. See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2132. 
271. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., POLICY 11: PAINFUL PROCEDURES (1997)  [here­
inafter POLICY 11], available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/downloads/ 
policy/policy11.pdf. 
272. A proposal to use animals in research, for example, must contain 
[a] description of procedures designed to assure that discomfort and pain to
 
animals will be limited to that which is unavoidable for the conduct of scientifi­
cally valuable research, including [a] provision for the use of analgesic, anes­
thetic, and tranquilizing drugs where indicated and appropriate to minimize
 
discomfort and pain to animals.
 
9 C.F.R § 2.31(e)(4) (2010) (emphasis added).  Also, “[p]rocedures that may cause 
more than momentary or slight pain or distress to . . . animals  . . . [must b]e performed 
with appropriate sedatives, analgesics or anesthetics, unless withholding such agents is 
justified for scientific reasons, in writing, by the principal investigator and will continue 
for only the necessary period of time.”  9 C.F.R § 2.31(d)(iv), (iv)(A) (emphasis added). 
273. POLICY 11, supra note 271, at 11.1. R 
274. Id. at 11.1-11.2 (emphasis added). 
275. Id. at 11.2. 
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and is no longer required by such research facility to carry out the 
research, test, or experiment for which such animal has been 
utilized.276 
In other words, inspectors may confiscate or destroy animals that 
are in distress as long as they are no longer useful for the experi­
ment that is causing them distress.277 
The Animal Care policy regarding painful procedures is prob­
lematic for three reasons.  One, an animal’s pain and distress is 
measured against a human standard.  A painful procedure is de­
fined “as any procedure that would reasonably be expected to cause 
more than slight or momentary pain and/or distress in a human be­
ing to which that procedure is applied.”278  Two, an animal exhibit­
ing signs of pain, discomfort, or distress may be denied appropriate 
relief if there is scientific justification.279  In this framework, an 
animal will almost always lose because benefits to humans typically 
are understood to outweigh an animal’s welfare. Three, because an 
animal cannot verbally communicate their pain and distress, labora­
tory staff must mostly rely on their clinical observations of objective 
measures of pain, discomfort, and distress, which include the exhibi­
tion of “decreased appetite [or] activity level, adverse reactions to 
touching inoculated areas, open sores [or] necrotic skin lesions, ab­
scesses, lameness, conjunctivitis, corneal edema, and photopho­
bia.”280  These objective measures fail, in part, because they 
indicate a level of pain, discomfort, and distress that is well beyond 
the threshold at which such suffering begins to occur.  Rather, these 
objective measures suggest that enough suffering has already oc­
curred that there is now a visible indication of it. 
As the AWA is currently written and interpreted administra­
tively, there is wide space for justifying animal suffering.  If there is 
scientific justification, an animal may be subjected to painful and 
distressing experiments.281  The minimized pain and necessary time 
276. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2146(a) (2006) (emphasis added); see also  9 
C.F.R. § 2.129. 
277. Salk v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. A120289, 2008 WL 5274536, at *5 
n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Department inspectors have the power to remove a suffer­
ing animal from a research facility, but only if that animal is no longer required by the 
research facility to carry out its research.”). 
278. POLICY 11, supra note 271, at 11.1 (emphasis added). R 
279. Policy 11 requires that “[a]nimals exhibiting signs of pain, discomfort, or dis­
tress . . . receive appropriate relief unless written scientific justification is provided in the 
animal activity proposal and approved by the IACUC.” Id. at 11.2 (emphasis added). 
280. Id. 
281. See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143 (a)(3)(C)(v). 
 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE305.txt unknown Seq: 45 29-SEP-11 13:43 
2011] CULTIVATING COMPASSIONATE LAW 899 
provisions of the AWA282 and the accompanying regulations283 au­
thorize torture284 of animals.  According to a common understand­
ing and a legal definition of torture, minimized and scientifically 
necessary pain and distress can be interpreted as torture.285  When 
deemed scientifically necessary, the infliction of intense pain to the 
body or mind of an animal may be used to extract information.286 
Information, in this context, is scientific knowledge extracted from 
the bodies of animals. 
CONCLUSION 
The social movement to guarantee humane treatment and con­
fer legal rights on nonhuman animals may seem odd or laughable to 
some.  But the portion of the human population that recognizes 
that animals, particularly primates, deserve to be treated with com­
passion, dignity, and respect is growing.  And the law will slowly, 
but eventually, change to reflect that growing commitment to pro­
tect animals. 
Currently, animal protective legislation is human-focused, 
which conflicts with its purported purpose of protecting animals. 
Granting animals legal protections and rights is about treating them 
with respect and compassion, about ensuring dignity, bodily integ­
rity, and freedom from invasive research.  Ideally, protective legis­
lation would put an end to all animal suffering. This, however, is an 
unreasonable short-term goal in light of the massive economic and 
social restructuring necessary to achieve that goal.  As an alterna­
tive, and a beginning, protective legislation should begin by banning 
all great ape invasive research and eventually phase out all primate 
invasive research.  All chimpanzees currently confined in research 
facilities should be retired to sanctuaries where they can live out the 
remainder of their lives in dignity and free from further suffering. 
And as invasive research is phased out, all primates should be re­
tired to sanctuaries. 
282. The AWA requires the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate standards 
“for animal care, treatment, and practices in experimental procedures to ensure that 
animal pain and distress are minimized.” Id. § 2143 (a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).  Fur­
thermore, “in any practice which could cause pain to animals . . . the withholding of 
tranquilizers, anesthesia, analgesia, or euthanasia when scientifically necessary shall 
continue for only the necessary period of time.” Id. § 2143 (a)(3)(C)(v) (emphasis 
added). 
283. See supra note 272. R 
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Efforts to guarantee humane treatment and confer legal rights 
on animals have primarily been driven by a theory of welfare or 
rights.  A framework for welfare-based laws sometimes falls short 
of its intended goal because of contradicting, competing interests. 
A framework for rights-based laws sometimes falls short because of 
an entrenched understanding of property, persons, and standing. 
An alternative to the current framework of welfare- or rights-based 
laws is a theory based on care. 
A care-based framework has the potential to disrupt the 
speciesist ideology that continues to support the current balancing 
of interests.  Compassion alone is not sufficient; however, decon­
structing speciesist ideology requires compassion.  Compassion for 
the dogs who were being victimized was the momentum that cre­
ated change in 1966 with the passage of the Laboratory Animal 
Welfare Act.  Compassion was the fuel behind subsequent amend­
ments to the Animal Welfare Act. The law changed when people 
witnessed the atrocities behind the laboratory door.  As the history 
and evolution of the AWA demonstrates, the way society thinks and 
behaves is shaped, in part, by compassion.  And the law “evolves 
from the way society thinks and behaves.”287 
A care-based framework pays attention to what animals are 
already communicating.  Our laws need to evolve to reflect our 
changing knowledge and understanding of animals.288 “We should 
not kill, . . . torture, and exploit animals because they do not want 
to be so treated, and we know that.  If we listen we can hear 
them.”289  Bruno clearly communicated this when he signed from 
the cage he was confined in: “KEY OUT.”290 
Karina L. Schrengohst* 
287. Clayton, supra note 36. R 
288. See Tribunal do Juri de Salvador [Jury Court of Salvador], No.833085-3/2005,´
In re Suı́ça, Correio da Bahia, 19.9.2005 (Brazil), English translation, available at http:// 
www.animallaw.info/nonus/cases/cabrsuicaeng2005.htm, Portuguese decision available 
at http://www.animallaw.info/nonus/cases/cabrsuicapt2005.htm; Clayton, supra note 36. R 
289. Donovan, supra note 20, at 375. R 
290. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 354. R 
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